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FIXING FAIR USE
MICHAEL W. CARROLL*
The fair use doctrine in copyright law balances expressive freedoms by
permitting one to use another’s copyrighted expression under certain
circumstances. The doctrine’s extreme context-sensitivity renders it of little
value to those who require reasonable ex ante certainty about the legality of
a proposed use. In this Article, Professor Carroll advances a legislative
proposal to create a Fair Use Board in the U.S. Copyright Office that
would have power to declare a proposed use of another’s copyrighted work to
be a fair use. Like a private letter ruling from the IRS or a “no action”
letter from the SEC, a favorable opinion would immunize only the
petitioner from copyright liability for the proposed use, leaving the copyright
owner free to challenge the same or similar uses by other parties. The
copyright owner would receive notice and an opportunity to challenge a
petition. Fair Use Rulings would be subject to administrative review in the
Copyright Office and to judicial review by the federal courts of appeals. The
Article closes with discussion of alternative approaches to fixing fair use.
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What is Fair Use? We would all appreciate a clear, crisp answer. . . . .[F]ar
from clear and crisp, fair use is better described as a shadowy territory whose
boundaries are disputed, more so now that it includes cyberspace than ever
before.. . . . [M]any legal scholars, politicians, copyright owners and users and
their lawyers agree that fair use is so hard to understand that it fails to provide
effective guidance for the use of others' works today. But the fact is, we really
must understand and rely on it.1
INTRODUCTION
Copyright law grants broad exclusive rights to encourage
authors to create and to distribute new expressive works. These rights
are powerful. Using copyright, a sculptor can halt distribution of a
major motion picture because a scene in the film uses the image of his
sculpture without authorization;2 the heir of a famous author can
threaten to halt publication of unfavorable scholarship;3 and a
songwriter can restrain distribution of a song that borrows three words
and a portion of the melody from his song.4 While this power renders
the author’s expression marketable,5 this power is also subject to
abuse.6
Office of General Counsel, University of Texas, Fair Use of Copyrighted Materials at
http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualProperty/copypol2.htm (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
2
Sculptor Frederick E. Hart brought suit to enjoin distribution of the film, “Devil’s
Advocate,” which included a scene in which Hart’s bas-relief sculpture, Ex Nihilo, at the
entrance to the Washington National Cathedral, comes to life. See Brooke A. Masters, Va.
Judge Tells Filmmaker to Settle Suit or Halt Video, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1998, at B2. The court
issued a deadline for settlement after which it would issue a preliminary injunction to stop
distribution of more than 400,000 videotapes of the film. Id. Warner Brothers studio asserted
that, if issued, the injunction would cost the studio and video stores more than $42 million.
See id.; see also Lawrence Siskind, The Devil's Advocate, 20 LEGAL TIMES at 23 (Mar. 23, 1998)
(discussing case); K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement and the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 173, 188-90 (2000) (describing this and similar cases).
3 See, e.g., D. T. Max, The Injustice Collector, THE NEW YORKER, Jun. 19, 2006, (describing use
of copyright law by James Joyce’s grandson to threaten scholars).
4 See Grand Upright Music, Ltd v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc.,780 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (enjoining song by rapper Biz Markie that sampled Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone Again
(Naturally)”).
5 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
6 See, e.g., West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 1986)
(affirming preliminary injunction against Lexis for distributing public domain judicial
1
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When fashioning modern copyright law, Congress recognized
that circumstances would arise in which the broad sweep of copyright
would be socially undesirable, and it responded by codifying a series of
limitations on copyright’s scope.7 Fair use is the first and most general
of these limitations.8 It renders unauthorized use of a copyrighted
work non-infringing if the balance of a set of context-specific factors
favors such use.
While the doctrine’s attention to context has many salutary
attributes, it is so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance
about its scope to artists, educators, journalists, Internet speakers and
other who require use of another’s copyrighted expression in order to
communicate effectively.9 The conventional wisdom is that this ex ante
uncertainty is simply the price that policymakers must accept for
choosing a standard over a rule.10 By this logic, if legal uncertainty
about copyright law’s scope has become more troubling in the digital
era – and it has – Congress should clarify fair use by rendering it more
rule-like, as has been done through the fair dealing privilege found in
English, Canadian and Australian law.11
This Article intervenes in the general rules/standards discourse
by showing that the law can have its context-sensitive standards and
use them too by coupling standards with an advisory opinion
mechanism that provides ex ante certainty in specific cases. Such a
mechanism already has been deployed in a variety of branches of
federal law, such as federal regulation of income taxation,12 sale of
securities,13 and subsidized health care.14 In operation, the advisory
opinions marked up with West’s allegedly copyrighted page numbers). But see Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that West’s
star pagination feature not protected by copyright).
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (defining limitations on copyrightable subject matter); id. §§ 107-122
(imposing limitations on scope of exclusive rights).
8 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
9 See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (documenting agreement concerning fair use
uncertainty).
10 See infra note 51 (citing to the rules/standards literature).
11 See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of fair use rules,
including fair dealing).
12 See 26 U.S.C. § 7805; Rev. Proc. 2004-1, § 2.01 (“A ‘letter ruling’ is a written determination
issued to a taxpayer by the Associate office that interprets and applies the tax laws to the
taxpayer’s specific set of facts.”).
13 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1-2 (authorizing “No Action Letter”).
14 See 42 C.F.R. § 411.370B.380 (authorizing advisory opinions regarding Medicare statute).
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opinion provides guidance in particular situations without creating a
thick body of binding precedent that ossifies the regulatory system.
This Article applies this insight by advancing a legislative
proposal to create a Fair Use Board in the Copyright Office that would
have authority to adjudicate fair use petitions and, subject to judicial
review, issue Fair Use Rulings. The effect of such a ruling, if favorable,
would be roughly analogous to a Private Letter Ruling from the
Internal Revenue Service15 or a “No Action” Letter from the Securities
and Exchange Commission16 - the individual user would be immune
from copyright liability for the proposed use but the ruling would be
non-precedential. Under the proposal, the fair use petitioner would be
obliged to serve notice on the copyright owner, who would have an
opportunity to contest the petition. Either party could appeal an
unfavorable ruling administratively and then to any federal circuit court
of appeals with personal jurisdiction over the parties.
The proposal is fair-use neutral because it would not change the
substantive entitlements granted by the Copyright Act. Rather, it
would simply give fair use a fair chance. Copyright owners would have
a full opportunity to assert their rights and would be no more
prejudiced by choosing not to contest particular petitions than they
currently are when they choose not to pursue action against uses they
deem infringing.
The problems caused by fair use uncertainty are sufficiently
urgent that I also endorse two less attractive proposals in the
alternative, in the event that the primary proposal is ahead of its time.
These alternatives focus on a different approach to fixing fair use –
reducing the risks of relying on fair use by limiting the remedies
available against a user who misinterprets the doctrine’s scope in good
faith. Under the first alternative, Congress would still create a Fair Use
Board, but the Board would serve only an advisory capacity. A
15 See 26 U.S.C. § 7805; Rev. Proc. 2004-1, § 2.01 (“A ‘letter ruling’ is a written determination
issued to a taxpayer by the Associate office that interprets and applies the tax laws to the
taxpayer’s specific set of facts.”).
16 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1-2.
No Action letters represent the position of the SEC’s
enforcement staff with respect to a proposed transaction, and the Commission is not bound
by that position. See id. However, these appear to be treated as binding de facto. See Donna
M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems
and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 943 (1998) (“[R]ecipients highly value
no-action letters, undoubtedly because the Commission appears to have never proceeded
against the recipient of a no-action letter who acted in good faith on the letter's advice.”).
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favorable fair use opinion would limit a user’s liability in the event that
a court subsequently determined that the subject use was infringing.17
Under the second alternative, Congress would extend to all potential
fair users a limit on statutory damages currently available only to
libraries, archives, colleges, universities, and public broadcasters.18
Finally, this Article analyzes why attempts to fix fair use by
rendering it more rule-like would be normatively unattractive and
would be likely to be ineffective in any case. Congress correctly
rejected rule-like proposals when it codified fair use in the Copyright
Act of 1976 because rules would be likely to be significantly over- and
under-inclusive. The expressive interests of authors and potential fair
users are of constitutional import and should be balanced with a degree
of context-sensitivity that rules cannot supply.
I. FAIR USE UNCERTAINTY
A. Overview
The fair use doctrine is rooted in the truth that we sometimes
must use the expression of another to express ourselves effectively.19
Fair use protects a zone of expressive opportunity for criticism,
comment, parody, education, and other socially beneficial forms of
This proposal could be implemented in conjunction with the current legislative process
concerning orphan works. See The Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong., 2d
Sess. (May 22, 2006) at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5439; UNITED
STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (Jan. 2006) (suggesting proposals
for limiting liability of user who made good faith effort to find untraceable copyright owner).
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2004). This limitation applies when one of these privileged users
infringes copyright with a mistaken but good faith belief that the use was a fair use. In
addition, this alternative proposal would limit the availability of injunctive relief in the case
of users acting in good faith.
19 See. e.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story, J.)
(principal judicial architect of fair use doctrine recognizing that “[e]very book in literature,
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known
and used before”). Some may be inclined to contest this truth claim. But, in its most limited
form, the claim holds that we must be able to quote one another to communicate effectively,
and I am aware of no legislator, judicial officer or copyright scholar who contests the value
of copyright law’s privilege for unauthorized quotation. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text 1971) art. 10(1) (“It shall be
permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully made available
to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent
does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper Articles
and periodicals in the form of press summaries.”).
17
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communication which might not occur if copyright owners were given
complete control over how their works were used. Recently, fair use
has been called upon to serve this function in a variety of new
situations because wide distribution of digital technologies has greatly
increased copyright law’s domain while also giving rise to a significantly
larger pool of potential fair users attracted to the remarkable
reproductive and adaptive power of these new technologies. The
dispute over Google’s digitization of large library collections is one of
many signs demonstrating that, in the digital age, questions of fair use
have taken on greater urgency.20
The Supreme Court has further fueled this urgency by
recognizing without describing the constitutional substrate
undergirding the fair use doctrine. When faced with a claim that the
First Amendment also directly secures a speaker’s right to use the
expression of another under certain circumstances, Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the Court, responded:
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to
make--or decline to make--one's own speech; it bears
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other
people's speeches. To the extent such assertions raise
First Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in free
speech safeguards are generally adequate to address
them. We recognize that the D. C. Circuit spoke too
broadly when it declared copyrights "categorically
immune from challenges under the First Amendment."
But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.21
See, e.g., The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y., complaint filed
Sep. 20, 2005) (alleging that large-scale intermediate digitization of libraries’ book collections
infringes copyright); Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright Analysis
(analyzing Google’s fair use argument in response to The Author’s Guild suit) at
http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googleprint.pdf#search=%22jonathan%20band%2
0google%20fair%20use%22 (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
21 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). The Court had previously identified fair
use as one of copyright law’s two free speech safeguards. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560
(“In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant
20
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Eldred does not hold that the fair use doctrine as currently interpreted
is constitutionally required. But, by rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s
categorical immunity for copyright, the Court held a fortiori that at least
some uses of another’s copyrighted expression qualify as speech
protected by the First Amendment. Thus, the holding in Eldred is that
the fair use doctrine as currently interpreted usually provides a defense
to infringement at least as robust as the one the First Amendment
would require and therefore that First Amendment defense requires no
further specification at this time. From the free speech perspective,
then, fair use is no constitutional understudy – it is the starring
attraction.
Regrettably, the “built-in free speech safeguards” of copyright
law lack important procedural protections for potential fair users that
the First Amendment provides for those who utter other forms of
protected speech. In particular, the Court, having recognized that the
risk of legal uncertainty is of particular concern when the law regulates
speech, has determined that the First Amendment requires the
safeguards of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to contain such
uncertainty.22 By contrast, the substantive context-sensitivity of the fair
use doctrine often fails to rein in the vague and sometimes overlybroad scope of copyright law.23
Indeed, those familiar with copyright law are well acquainted
with the difficulties in providing guidance concerning the application
of the fair use doctrine, and federal judges themselves acknowledge the
point. Judge Posner, for example, has candidly admitted that only
minimal guidance can be drawn from Section 107,24 and, Judge Leval
has succinctly put the problem thus:
for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to
copyright.”).
22 See infra note 144 (describing First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness).
23 See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE
L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2007) (describing feedback loop in which fair use uncertainty leads to
licensing that serves to reduce the scope of fair use in future cases).
24 See Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (“The
important point is simply that, as the Supreme Court made clear . . . the four factors are a
checklist of things to be considered rather than a formula for decision; and likewise the list
of statutory purposes.”); see also William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use And Statutory
Reform In The Wake Of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004) (“All section 107 really amounts
to in practical terms is confirmation that the courts are entitled to allow in the name of fair
use a certain undefined amount of unauthorized copying from copyrighted works. This may
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Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair
use. Earlier decisions provide little basis for predicting
later ones.
Reversals and divided courts are
commonplace. . . . . Confusion has not been confined
to judges. Writers, historians, publishers, and their legal
advisers can only guess and pray as to how courts will
resolve copyright disputes.25
The treatise writers are in accord that the fair use doctrine
produces significant ex ante uncertainty.26 Indeed, when writing more
pointedly in a legal periodical, treatise author David Nimmer examined
many fair use cases and the findings on each of the factors and
concluded that “had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the
particular four fair use factors . . . it appears that the upshot would be
the same.”27 That is to say, “the four factors fail to drive the analysis,
but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to hang antecedent
conclusions.”28 Other legal scholars also have expressed concerned
about fair use uncertainty, and have suggested approaches different
than this Article’s proposal to reduce it.29
seem an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of defining fair use, and indeed the uncertain
contours of the defense raise serious problems . . . .”).
25 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (1990).
26 See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][b]
at 13-162 (citing e.g. Castle Rock v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir.
1998)); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT §12.2.2 at 12:34 (3d.ed 2005);
WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW ___ (2d ed. 1995); see also
William Patry, What’s the Role of the Fourth Fair Use Factor?, The Patry Copyright Blog, May 3,
2005, at http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005_05_01_williampatry_archive.html.
27 David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 263, 280 (2003).
28 Id. at 281. Professor Barton Beebe’s statistical analysis of more than 200 fair use opinions
is consistent with this conclusion. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright
Fair Use Cases, 1978-2005: A Quick Report of Initial Findings for IPSC 2006 (draft Aug. 10, 2006)
(on file with author) (“While I know of no statistical way to show that courts are indeed
putting the cart before the horse when they engage in a Section 107 analysis, the strong
evidence of stampeding is at least consistent with Nimmer’s description.”).
29 For example, Professor Jessica Litman would rein in the initial grant of rights to render
users’ rights more ascertainable. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 166-86 (2001)
(proposing unfair competition standard for infringement). Professor Michael Madison argues
for a pattern-oriented approach to fair use and would amend Section 107 to give courts
greater freedom to identify the social practices that should inform fair use analysis. See
Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS &
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The costs of fair use uncertainty are manifest. Potential fair
users routinely are deterred from engaging in a desired use by the
uncertain scope of the fair use doctrine coupled with the high costs of
litigation and the potentially enormous statutory damages that a court
could award if it disagrees with the user’s fair use judgment.30 This is
particularly the case when a potential fair user seeks to communicate
with the public through traditional mass media or on the Internet.31
For example, two recent reports, discussed in greater detail below,
demonstrate that many media gatekeepers will not accept an author’s,
musician’s, or filmmaker’s fair use determination, nor will they make
Instead these gatekeepers require copyright
one on their own.32
clearance any time an artist seeks to express herself with the speech of
another through fair use quotation, incidental use, or even de minimis
use. Through these practices, fair use has been rendered unduly
circumscribed or non-existent in important cultural spheres.
ENT. L.J. 391 (2005); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004). Separately, rather than seeking a legislative response to fair use
uncertainty, Professor Peter Jaszi, along with the Center for Social Media, has been working
with documentary filmmakers to generate negotiated fair use norms that would be
instantiated in a set of “best practices” adopted by content industries, particularly the film
industry. See DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE
(2005)
available
at
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/publications/statement_of_best_practices_
in_fair_use/. The proposals advanced in this Article could work in conjunction with any of
these approaches.
30 See, e.g., generally MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE: FREE EXPRESSION IN
THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005) (reporting results of focus groups with creators
and
scholars
concerning
chilling
effect
of
fair
use
uncertainty)
at
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (visited Aug. 25, 2006); R.
Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423,
429 (2005) (discussing growing uncertainty concerning scope of fair use and “truly
pernicious effects” of such uncertainty); Gibson, supra note XX, at ___[3-4] (same).
31 See generally HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5-6 (summarizing gatekeeping institutions
that require copyright clearance for even very small uses of copyrighted works, such as the
quotation of one or two sentences); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright As A Model For Free
Speech Law: What Copyright Has In Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 20-21, 24 (2000) (describing
chilling effects of copyright law’s vague scope).
32 See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (discussing HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29,
and PAT AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE
CULTURE
(2004)
at
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf (visited
Aug. 25, 2006).
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B. Doctrinal Causes of Uncertainty
If uncertainty about copyright’s scope chills expression, surely
there must be doctrinal responses that would provide greater clarity?
There has been no shortage of scholarly commentary directed at
providing a fair use theory that would lead to such clarity.33 To date,
however, Congress and the courts have resisted attempts to clarify fair
use. The remainder of this subsection explains why. Readers already
familiar with the doctrinal causes of fair use uncertainty may wish to
proceed directly to the proposal in Section II.
1. Copyright Infringement
Copyright applies to any “original work of authorship” at the
moment it is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”34 Originality
is a very low standard that requires only a minimal spark of creativity.35
As a consequence, copyright applies to a broad range of works,
including shampoo bottle labels,36 technical manuals,37 county tax
33 A sample of this extensive literature includes: Symposium, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (2005); Laura R. Bradford, Parody And Perception: Using Cognitive
Research To Expand Fair Use In Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2005); Madison, Rewriting Fair
Use, supra note 28; William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use And Statutory Reform In The
Wake Of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair
Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech And How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Raymond
Shih Ray Ku, Consumers And Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 539 (2003); Nimmer, Fairest of Them All, supra note 26; Justin Hughes, Fair Use
Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use In A Changing World, 50 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 133 (2003); Wendy Gordon, Excuse And Justification In The Law Of
Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part Of The Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 149 (2003); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use And Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
Rev. 975 (2002); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, And Other Kinds Of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine For
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107 (2001); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1291 (1999); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change The Less They Seem
"Transformed": Some Reflections On Fair Use, 46 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 251 (1998); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Putting Cars On The "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, And Copyright In
Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466 (1995); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1992); Leval, supra note 21; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing
The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market
Failure: A Structural And Economic Analysis Of The Betamax Case And Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1600 (1982).
34 Id. §§ 102(a); 201(a).
35 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991).
36 See, e.g., Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
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maps,38 commercial photographs of products,39 and in some cases even
blank forms.40
The Copyright Act grants authors the exclusive rights to
reproduce, to publicly distribute, to publicly perform, to publicly
display, and to adapt their copyrighted works.41 The copyright owner’s
right to control reproduction of the work extends to partial borrowings
and to adaptations so long as the defendant had access to the owner’s
work and the defendant’s work is “substantially similar” to the
copyright owner’s in the eyes of an ordinary observer.42 The copyright
owner’s rights are limited to her original expression and do not
encompass any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery.43
Liability for copyright infringement is strict. Under the current
interpretation of the Copyright Act, members of the public who
exercise any of the copyright owner’s rights without authorization are
prima facie infringers regardless of their intent or knowledge. In this
environment, producers, distributors, readers, viewers, and all other
users have a strong interest in distinguishing between infringing events
and non-infringing events.
This is particularly true because the consequences of
infringement can be quite severe. Courts may enjoin the continued
distribution of an infringing work and can order the destruction of all
infringing copies.44 In addition, the copyright owner may elect at any
37 See, e.g., Highland Tank & Mfg. Co. v. PS Intern., Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 348, 360-61 (W.D.
Pa. 2005).
38 See, e.g., County of Suffolk, New York v. First American Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d
179 (2d Cir. 2001).
39 See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
40 See Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2003).
41 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting rights to reproduce the work in copies, prepare derivative
works, distribute the work in copies, publicly perform the work, or publicly display the
work).
42 See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70 (2d
Cir.1999).
43 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Line-drawing difficulties under the idea/expression dichotomy
frequently arise in cases such as narrative works in which plot lines and characters resemble
one another. Does, for example, West Side Story borrow Shakespeare’s expression in
Romeo and Juliet or merely his idea? This particular difficulty is not the focus of our present
concern, but fair use determinations are analogously difficult. Logically, fair use does not
arise as an issue until after the plaintiff establishes that the defendant used the plaintiff’s
expression.
44 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503(b).
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time before final judgment is rendered to receive actual damages,
including the infringer’s profits attributable to infringement, or
statutory damages.45 The range for statutory damages is between $750
and $30,000 per infringed work, and this amount can be increased to
$150,000 per work if willful infringement is proven.46 (It is for this
reason that the Recording Industry Association of America has
threatened individuals hosting music files on peer-to-peer networks
with the prospect of hundreds of millions of dollars in potential
damages: $150,000 x number of songs hosted = potential statutory
damages.) And, in many cases, the real threat is the fee-shifting
provision by which defendants can be made to pay the copyright
owner’s attorney’s fees, which can exceed the amount of damages.47
2. Fair Use
In the language of the Copyright Act, fair use is a “limitation”
on the exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner.48 This language
supports a reading that would require the copyright owner to prove
infringement by showing that the defendant’s use exceeded the bounds
of fair use.49 could be read to require the copyright owner to prove
that the defendant had exceeded the bounds of fair use, currently the
copyright owner need prove only ownership of a valid copyright and
that the defendant exercised one of the exclusive rights with respect to

See id. § 504.
Id.
47 See id. § 505; see also Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 447 F.3d 769,
776 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting fair use defense and awarding copyright owner $210,000 in
damages and $516,271 for attorneys’ fees); Marshall & Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F.
Supp. 952, 954 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (same with $9,450 in damages and $38,713 for attorneys’
fees); Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A.0003-44444962, 2005
WL 1244923, *1 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2005) (same with $150,000 in statutory damages and
$205,586.67 for attorneys’ fees); Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That – The Defendant’s Dilemma, 55
LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 107, 107 (1992) (“It seems likely that, over the years, no provision
of the American copyright law has exceeded that now codified as 17 U.S.C. section 505 in
influencing the actual conduct of infringement litigation.”).
48 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).
49 Cf. Quality King v. L’Anza, 523 U.S. 123, 144-45 (1998) (emphasizing that Section 106
rights are limited by Sections 107-120).
45
46
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the registered work.50 The defendant must prove fair use as an
affirmative defense.51
The scope of the fair use defense is sufficiently uncertain in
light of the potential penalties to scare away a sizeable portion of
potential users whose proposed use of a copyrighted work would be
fair if the matter were litigated to judgment. To see why, begin with
Section 107, which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.52

See, e.g. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d
Cir.1998).
51 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. at 561; Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191,
197 (3d Cir.2003).
52 17 U.S.C. § 107.
50
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Within the literature on rules and standards,53 fair use is a
quintessential standard.54 It is well established that standards trade off
greater ex ante certainty for greater ex post context-sensitivity unless
cultural or other contextual factors function to cabin a decisionmaker’s
discretion.55 One strategy for improving the ex ante certainty of a legal
standard’s application is to subject its application to evidentiary
presumptions, which limit the range of relevant evidence. However,
Congress and the courts have resisted attempts to deploy this
strategy.56 Here is a quick summary of why this resistance has resulted
in significant ex ante uncertainty about fair use.57
Preamble. Section 107 identifies types of unauthorized uses of
a copyrighted work that might be deemed fair – criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. This list could serve
to clarify the scope of a fair user’s right in two ways: the list could be
construed as exclusive and/or the listed uses could be deemed
presumptively fair. Courts have resisted both approaches. The listed

The rules/standards literature is substantial. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
104 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379430 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-93
(1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783-90
(1989); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); Eric A. Posner, Standards,
Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1997).
54 The terms “rules” and “standards” are at this point used as shorthand to differentiate
degrees of ex post discretion enjoyed by those who apply the law, and it is in that sense that
fair use is a standard. But commentators have laid out more complex taxonomies according
to which standards are differentiated from other provisions, such as multi-factor tests, which
also provide significant ex post discretion. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 51, at 965. For those
for whom this is a distinction with a difference, I mean to say that fair use is a multi-factor
test rather than a standard.
55 See id. (acknowledging that ex post discretion conferred by standards and factors is subject
to cabining by interpretive practices); Kaplow, supra note 51, at 559-60.
56 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994):
The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.... Nor may the
four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to
be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright.
57 For a more detailed analysis of the language, see Madison, Pattern-Oriented Approach, supra
note X, at 1550-64.
53
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uses are illustrative only,58 and they are not entitled to a presumption of
fairness.59 Consequently, the language of the preamble does little work
in the judicial application of fair use. The application of the factors
leads to similar results.
Purpose and Character of the Use. Under the first factor,
courts focus on whether or not the use should be characterized as
commercial and whether it should be deemed transformative.60 The
defendant’s good faith has been added, or perhaps recognized, as a
material sub-factor.61 A commercial use may tend to threaten the
copyright owners’ core economic incentive and therefore tends to be
less likely to be fair. The Supreme Court initially favored a
presumption against commercial use, defined broadly,62 but it soon
recognized an overbreadth problem with such an approach. Under
current law all of the factors must be examined in evaluating a claim of
fair use.63
In contrast to the concerns for copyright owners engendered by
commercial use, focus on transformative use emphasizes the public’s
perspective by asking whether the user’s work supplants the original,
“or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-579 (1994) (describing the
preamble as containing examples that may guide analysis); Ringgold v. Black Entertainment
Television, 126 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the examples in the preamble should
not be completely ignored); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984)
(stating that the preamble is illustrative, and holding that the trial court erred in finding the
list exclusive).
59 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (stating that an educational purpose is not guaranteed to be a
fair use); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985)
(stating that the statute was not intended to create any presumption of fairness).
60 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608-09 (2d Cir.
2006); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003).
61 See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004); Nunez v.
Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000); Beebe, supra note 27, at 12
(finding that 13% of opinions reviewed explicitly considered whether defendant’s use was in
good or bad faith).
62 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984). The
Court defined commercial use as “not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain
but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (holding that publishing an
excerpt from a biography of President Ford in advance of publication by another who had
the exclusive right not fair use).
63 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 584; Sundeman v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 203 (4th
Cir.1998).
58
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message.”64 The doctrine of transformative use65 is a frequentlylitigated, though indeterminate sub-factor66
Evidence of a defendant’s commercial exploitation, good faith,
or expressive transformation of the plaintiff’s work will always be
relevant to fair use analysis, but these considerations offset one another
in any given case and so the law provides little ex ante guidance about
the weight a court will assign to such evidence.67
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. The second factor focuses
on whether the work is factual rather than fictional and whether the
work is published or unpublished.68 One function of this factor is to
guard against enlarging the scope of rights in a factual compilation
beyond the copyrighted selection or arrangement to cover the
uncopyrightable facts.69 Generally, however, this factor serves as a
thumb on the scale in favor of the copyright owner because most
works are deemed creative.70 Even in cases involving factual works,
this factor does little work if the court finds substantial creativity in the
use of facts.71
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval).
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)
(coining the term and defining it as a productive use of the material for a different purpose).
66 Id. But see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Article: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 559-60 (2004) (arguing that doctrine of
transformative use leads courts to undervalue expressive importance of copying).
67 See, e.g., Compaq Computer, Inc. v. Ergonome, Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004)
(evidence supported jury’s determination of fair use with respect to computer manufacturer’s
unauthorized commercial use of photographs of proper hand position to avoid repetitive
stress injury in computer user’s manual); NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 479 (finding that
transformative nature of defendant’s work tipped first factor in its favor even though use
was commercial and copy of plaintiff’s unpublished work assumed to have been acquired in
bad faith); Los Angeles News Serv. v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 939-40 (9th Cir.
2002) (describing uses as having offsetting commercial and transformative properties and
concluding that first factor “weakly” favors fair use).
68 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir.
2006).
69 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548 (stating that the creative element in even factual works
has left the law “unsettled” with regard to the scope of protection for factual works); see also
Sony, 464 U.S. at 496-497 (stating that factual works lend themselves more to productive use
by others).
70 See Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir.
2006); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003); Dr. Seuss
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997).
71 Compare Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that film of Muhammed Ali used was historical, and not particularly
creatively rendered); and Robinson v. Random House, 877 F.Supp. 830, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
64
65
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With respect to publication status, the Harper & Row Court
emphasized that the author should retain control over the initial
dissemination of a work and therefore unauthorized uses of
unpublished works will be less likely to be deemed fair.72 The Court
appeared to have created a presumption against fair use in the case of
unpublished works, and some lower courts appeared to have rendered
In 1992, Congress
this consideration outcome-determinative.73
responded to concerns expressed by the publishing industry by
overruling any interpretations that treated unpublished works as
entitled to a conclusive presumption against fair use.74 Consequently,
the second factor tends to do little work in swaying the outcome of any
fair use inquiry.75
Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Copyright
law excuses de minimis unauthorized exercise of a copyright owner’s
exclusive rights.76 For purposes of the fair use inquiry, then, the third
factor establishes a sliding scale above the de minimis threshold.77 The
focus of the inquiry is on what was taken from the plaintiff’s work, not
on how much of the defendant’s work is comprised of copied
material.78 Theoretically, this factor should weigh increasingly against
(finding that factor two favored infringer, though historical work contained creativity); with
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72-73 (2d Cir 1999)
(finding the second factor at best neutral because the work was a creatively-expressed news
article).
72 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553 (citations omitted).
73 See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991); New Era Publ’n Int’l, v.
Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that unpublished work is
usually completely protected); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
1987) (stating that unpublished work is usually completely protected); Sinkler v. Goldsmith,
623 F. Supp. 727, 723 (D. Ariz. 1986) (stating that fair use generally only applies to published
works).
74 See Fair Use of Unpublished Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492 (1992), 102d Cong., 2d Sess.,
106 Stat. 3145 codified at 17 U.S.C. §107.
75 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612 (“We recognize, however, that the second
factor may be of limited usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for a
transformative purpose.”); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2003).
76 See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998); Ringgold
v. Black Ent. TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75-77 (2d Cir. 1997); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1988).
77 See Gordon v. Nextel Comm. and Mullen Advertising, Inc., 345 F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir.
2003) (“A court will examine the fair use defense only if the de minimis threshold for
actionable copying has been exceeded.”).
78 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)). However, if a large portion of the infringing work is copied
material, the court may infer that the copied work is qualitatively substantial. Id.
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the plaintiff as the quantitative amount taken increases. However, this
does not always follow. On the one hand, the Harper & Row Court
focused on qualitative analysis – whether the copied portion was the
“heart” of the work – which renders quantitative analysis largely
immaterial.79 On the other hand, the third factor must be weighed
with the purpose and character of the use in mind, which can render
even quantitatively large borrowings fair.80
Effect Upon the Potential Market. If copyright is to supply
authors with an economic incentive to create, unauthorized uses that
undermine the incentive by sufficiently reducing the copyright owner’s
ability to profit from the work will be deemed unfair. This factor will
be determinative in rendering run-of-the-mine infringements, such as
the sale of “bootlegged” CDs or DVDs, unfair.81 However, the
analysis under this factor extends beyond the defendant’s use and
beyond the plaintiff’s existing sales and licensing markets. Instead, the
fourth factor can weigh against a finding of fair use if the use were to
become widespread or were to affect the plaintiff’s potential markets.82
The Court has held that there must be a distinction between
suppressing demand and usurping it.83 Destruction of demand for a
See id. (quoting 557 F. Supp. at 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-587 (1994); id. at 580 (stating
definition of parody requires imitation of the original work to comment upon it). Compare
Los Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that
though KCAL took only a small amount of news footage, it was “all that mattered”);
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925-926 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding
that each article within a larger periodical was a separate copyrightable work, rather than a
small portion of one work); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that making Seinfeld quiz book was entertainment, not
criticism, so amount taken was substantial) with Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d
194, 205-206 (4th Cir 1998) (finding that substantial significant portion of copyrighted work
was not the “heart” of the work, nor was it quantitatively large in light of the educational
purpose).
81 See, e.g., U.S. v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) (no abuse of discretion in refusing
fair use instruction in criminal trial concerning unauthorized distribution of software).
82 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)); see also Castle Rock, 150 F.3d, at 145-146 (finding that even if
the copyright owner would not take advantage of that market, the fact that they could
weighs against fair use) and American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930-931 (finding that since the
licensing of individual articles had become available in the industry, the potential license fees
could be evidence of market harm) .
83 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (citations omitted); see also Castle Rock, 150 F.3d, at 145
(making the distinction between parody, which would not be the owner’s market, and
tribute, which would).
79
80
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work in the absence of replacing it with copied material is not a
cognizable loss.84 The hard evidentiary questions for courts concern
the likelihood that the defendant’s use might become widespread and
the likelihood that a market will emerge to supply a license or sale for
such use.85
As a doctrinal matter, the status of the fourth factor is
contested. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court pronounced this to be
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”86 The
Court subsequently retreated, emphasizing again the case-specific
nature of the doctrine and holding that no factor was entitled to
privileged status in fair use analysis.87 Nonetheless, some lower courts
continue to follow the Harper & Row dictum.88
Summary. The broad legal standard set forth in Section 107
grants courts considerable interpretive discretion, and lawmakers have
resisted attempts to cabin this discretion through the use of evidentiary
presumptions. While this interpretation of fair use leaves courts free to
be sensitive to the nuances of any given case, leading courts and
commentators generally acknowledge that the four-factor test as
interpreted provides very little guidance for predicting whether a
particular use will be deemed fair.89

See Campbell, 510 U.S., at 591-592.
Nunez v. Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st. Cir. 2000) (“Surely the
market for professional photographs of models publishable only due to the controversy of
the photograph itself is small or nonexistent.”).
86 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
87 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
88 See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2004); Bond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003); Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 206
(4th Cir. 1998); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Systems Intern., Inc., 428 F.Supp.2d
1369, 1379 (S.D. Ga. 2006); Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F.Supp.2d 442,
448 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Dahlen v. Michigan Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 132 F.Supp.2d 574, 587
(E.D.Mich. 2001); see also Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998)
(noting post-Campell lower court inconsistency in treatment of fourth factor); Beebe, supra
note 27, at 12 (“The data suggest, however, that the factor is nearly decisive whether it tilts in
favor of the plaintiff or the defendant—though, admittedly, slightly more so when it tilts in
favor of the former.”).
89 See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §13.05[A][5] at
13-189 (2005).
84
85
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C. Judicial Application Adds Little Certainty
Even when courts resist using heuristics such as evidentiary
presumptions to identify fair uses, judicial application of an uncertain
legal standard over time can lead to some predictability for at least a
subset of cases. The conundrum is that most defendants lack
incentives to defend novel fair use interpretations. Indeed, in the face
of the case-specific fair use doctrine and its accompanying uncertainty,
it is reasonable to imagine that users will hesitate to rely on fair use
unless the risk of enforcement appears low. Moreover, because the
penalties for erroneously relying on fair use can be quite severe,90 even
if users adopt a very conservative interpretation of the doctrine, we
should expect that primarily well-resourced users would be willing to
assert fair use rights in litigation. Evidence of how fair use currently
functions supports this view.
There are a range of cases in which the question of fair use
recurs. In a few settings, litigation has provided ex ante certainty
through the emergence of soft fair use rules. The first use is reverse
engineering of software through decompilation or disassembly of
object code for purposes of developing competing or complementary
entertainment products or platforms. The courts have held that
making an intermediate copy of a competitor’s software for purposes
of gaining access to uncopyrightable elements is a fair use so long as
the final product is not substantially similar to the competitor’s.91 This
however is a narrow rule. In related settings, fair use remains as
uncertain as ever.92 A second soft fair use rule is that personal copying
See supra notes XX-XX and accompanying text (discussing magnitude of penalties for
copyright infringement).
91 See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that intermediate copying for the purpose of reverse engineering Playstation was a fair use);
DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Bateman
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 896 F.
Supp. 1050, 1056- 57 (D. Colo. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir.
1997); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (original opinion issuing
fair use rule); see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of
Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, pt. IV (2002) (justifying this fair use rule in terms of
economics of reverse engineering in software industry).
92 See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Sega and rejecting fair use defense because “[r]ather than
being part of an attempt at reverse engineering, the copying appears to have been done after
Pulsecom had determined how the system functioned and merely to demonstrate the
interchangeability of the Pulsecom POTS cards with those made and sold by
90
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for purposes of “time shifting” is fair.93 The rationale for this rule
would extend to other forms of private copying, but litigation in
relation to these uses is too sparse to declare the emergence of a soft
rule.94 Similarly, it is probably the case that an Internet search engine’s
copying of web pages for purposes of indexing is either implicitly
licensed or is categorically fair,95 but the case law is not sufficient to
declare it so. Finally, the other clarifying rule is that commercial piracy
– wholesale commercial duplication of a copyrighted work for nonexpressive purposes – is not a fair use. 96 These fair use rules, however,
are too narrow to provide a model for fair use clarification in other
settings.
Instead, in order to evaluate whether traditional litigation has
been able to clarify the scope of fair use in the nearly 30 years since the
1976 Act took effect, let us consider examples of each of the favored
uses called out in Section 107’s preamble beginning with one of the
most frequently-litigated fair uses: parody. 97
1. Comment or Criticism
As a general matter, using another’s expression for purposes of
comment or criticism often is considered a paradigmatic fair use,
particularly when the commentary is directed at the borrowed work.98
In addition, in cultural conversation, poking fun at, or criticizing,

DSC.holding.”); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409 (S.D.
Tex. 1995) (holding that copying software to duplicate pre-failure warning on its compatible
hard drives not fair use).
93 See Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of
Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 134-35 (2006).
94 See id. at 135-38.
95 Cf. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
96 See, e.g., U.S. v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) (no abuse of discretion in refusing
fair use instruction in criminal trial concerning unauthorized distribution of software);
Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir.1989) (“[W]here, as here, [defendant’s]
use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [plaintiff's], such use seriously weakens a claimed fair
use.”).
97 See PATRY, FAIR USE, supra note XX, at 162-202 (discussing leading parody cases); see also
Beebe, surpa, note XX at 5 (showing that almost 10% of district court opinions examined
involved a claim of parody).
98 Some such uses, such as quotations in book reviews, are recognized as fair uses and are
therefore infrequently litigated. There are however quantitative and qualitative limitations to
this principle, as Harper & Row demonstrates.
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dominant discourse is commonplace.99 One means of exercising this
freedom is through parody and satire. These forms of dissent
implicate copyright law because they require borrowing dominant
expression in order to be effective.100 Not surprisingly, copyright
owners frequently take offense at parodic borrowings, and defendants
frequently respond that their expression is quintessentially a fair use.
Some professional parodists appear comfortable relying on fair
use, even with its context-dependent character. For example, those
who produce and distribute comedic television programming such as
Saturday Night Live, South Park, the Simpsons, the Daily Show, and
the Colbert Report, routinely rely on fair use’s protection for parody.
In the case of Saturday Night Live, for example, NBC appears willing
to litigate the occasional legal challenge.101 In contrast, the recording
company that represents “Weird Al” Yankovic, whose profession is to
record parodies of popular songs along with some original
compositions, has chosen to seek licenses and to avoid any reliance on
fair use.102
For those potential fair users who do not make parody a daily
part of their business, the parody cases that have been litigated to
judgment do not supply much in the way of general guidance. To
greatly simplify matters, the essential tension arises in parody cases that
pit the defendant’s creativity in transforming the plaintiff’s work
against the commercial nature of the defendant’s use. If ex ante clarity
could be had in this context, it might be supplied by a definitive ruling
by the highest court in the land. It appeared to some as if this had
been delivered.
In 1989, the rap group 2 Live Crew transformed Roy Orbison's
"Oh, Pretty Woman" into “Big Hairy Woman,” delivering new lyrics in
rap style over the essential musical elements of Orbison’s composition.
See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003).
See, e.g., Cambell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994); SunTrust Bank
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001).
101 See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that Saturday Night Live skit parodying “I Love New York” advertising jingle was
fair use).
102 See “Weird Al” Yankovic, The Official Website, FAQ (“Al does get permission from the
original writers of the songs that he parodies. While the law supports his ability to parody
without permission, he feels it's important to maintain the relationships that he's built with
artists and writers over the years.”) at http://www.weirdal.com/faq.htm (visited Aug. 25,
2006).
99

100
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The group's manager requested permission to release the song from
Acuff-Rose Music, owner of the copyright in Orbison’s musical
work.103 Acuff-Rose refused permission, but 2 Live Crew released the
song anyway.104 Acuff-Rose filed suit.105 Initially, 2 Live Crew took
the position that it had made a cover version of the Orbison song
under the statutory license for cover songs.106 The group wisely
abandoned that defense and pinned its hopes on fair use.
In its opinion, the Court rebuffed attempts to clarify the fair use
inquiry in parody cases through evidentiary presumptions. On the one
hand, the Court declared that a commercial use could not be deemed
presumptively unfair.107 On the other hand, the Court refused to grant
parody a presumption of fairness, while recognizing that parody
requires some use of its target to be effective.108 Moreover, the opinion
introduced a material distinction between parody and satire for fair use
purposes.109 Since the song in this case fell on the parody side of the
divide, the case was settled on terms largely favorable to the parodists
after remand.110
For future cases, the Court’s emphasis on context-sensitivity
and the interdependence of the four factors provide little hope for any
certainty. But, one could read the Court’s opinion to have created a
reasonably predictable safe harbor for parody applicable at least when
the target of the parody is the copyrighted work and when the parodist
has not taken “too much.” Although each of these elements also has
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
Id. at 573 (2 Live Crew did credit the songwriters and the publisher).
105 See Id.
106 See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1152 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev’d,
972 F.2d 1429 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom. Campell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2004) (providing statutory license to record musical composition so
long as essential melody and lyrics are preserved).
107 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85.
108 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581 (“The Act has no hint of an evidentiary preference for
parodists over their victims, and no workable presumption for parody could take account of
the fact that parody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative
artifacts, or that a work may contain both parodic and nonparodic elements. Accordingly,
parody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged
case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law.”).
109 See id. at 590-91 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some
claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collective victims') imagination, whereas satire can
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”).
110 See Associated Press, Acuff-Rose settles suit with rap group, MEMPH. COMMERCIAL APPEAL,
June 05, 1996, at A14.
103
104
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fuzzy boundaries, this rule of thumb would seem to make it easier to
conduct ex ante fair use analysis.
To test this hypothesis, consider how you, as legal adviser,
would apply fair use under the following circumstances. Your client is
an academic press that is willing to publish the following two books
only if in your opinion as counsel there is a 75% or better chance that a
court would grant summary judgment in favor of fair use in the event
that the publisher were sued. In each case, parody would be your best
argument.
Book 1. The story, The Wind Done Gone, appropriates the
characters, plot and major scenes from Margaret Mitchell’s iconic novel
Gone with the Wind. In The Wind Done Gone, the author, an AfricanAmerican woman, tells the story of the antebellum South through the
eyes of Cyanara, who is Scarlett O’Hara’s mixed-race half-sister and
full-time lover of Rhett Butler.111 The significant narrative elements
from Gone With the Wind are all transformed to dramatically alter the
relative strengths and nuances of the African-American and white
characters, and a number of relationships from the original have been
reimagined. For example, the character Ashley Wilkes, is rendered as a
gay man. For this reason, among others, there is no chance that the
Mitchell estate would grant a license to publish this work.112 Is fair use
as applied to parody sufficiently clear that you would advise your client
to publish the book?
Book 2. The author has written a book entitled The Cat NOT in
the Hat: A Parody by Dr. Juice, which tells the tale of the O.J. Simpson
trial (non-copyrightable facts) in the style of Theodor Geisel’s (a.k.a.
Dr. Seuss’s) Cat in the Hat. Recall that the Seuss original is a morality
tale about a brother and sister’s mishaps when visited by the Cat in the
Hat while their mother is away. In the Cat NOT in the Hat, the graphic
elements of the original are borrowed and samples of the text are as
follows:

See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1268.
See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1270 n.26 (“[I]t is evident from the record evidence that
SunTrust makes a practice of requiring authors of its licensed derivatives to make no
references to homosexuality.”); see also id. at 1282 (Marcus, J., concurring) (arguing that
unwillingness to license should influence fourth fair use factor).

111
112
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A happy town
Inside L.A.
Where rich folks play
The day away.
But under the moon
The 12th of June.
Two victims flail
Assault! Assail!
Somebody will go to jail!
Who will it be?
Oh my! Oh me!113
and the tale ends:
JUICE
+ST
JUSTICE
Hmm ... take the word JUICE.
Then add ST.
Between the U and I, you see.
And then you have JUSTICE. Or maybe you don't.
Maybe we will.
And maybe we won't.
'Cause if the Cat didn't do it?
Then who? Then who?
Was it him?
Was it her?
Was it me?
Was it you?
Oh me! Oh my!
Oh my! Oh me!
The murderer is running free.114
Assume again the same conditions. Is the parody defense sufficiently
strong to advise publication?
113See

Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir.
1997) (quoting original).
114 Id. at 1402.
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Most readers probably feel ill-equipped to answer these
questions without seeing the entirety of the works in question – raising
the costs of your legal advice. After reading the full works, many
copyright lawyers would probably conclude that the case for fair use is
stronger for Book 1 than it is for Book 2. But, when faced with the
risk-averse conditions posed in the hypothetical questions, many
copyright lawyers probably would be unwilling to give the client
sufficient assurance for publication to go forward even after the
Supreme Court’s Campbell opinion was handed down.
If one reads Campbell to have provided a parody safe harbor, in
each case, arguments can be made about both the targeting and the
amount of borrowing. For the first book, the case for targeting of
Mitchell’s original is clearer, but the amount borrowed is also quite
extensive. In the second book, the argument for targeting is more
strained but one can make the case that the narrative contrasts the
relative harmlessness of Geisel’s trickster figure with a presumed-guilty
Simpson. In addition, the amount borrowed is relatively small. The
graphic character of the cat is the most significant borrowing because
the story is comprised of public domain facts, and Geisel’s estate does
not own a copyright in the meter of his rhymes. Moreover, in each of
these books, and in Campbell itself, the relationship between white and
black Americans lurks as relevant but ambiguous consideration. Is this
relevant to whether “too much” has been taken? If so, how?
Litigation of parody cases provides some ex ante guidance about
fair use, and it arguably has created a simplified safe harbor analysis for
the parody context. Even with these benefits, uncertainty remains a
problem sufficient to chill risk-averse users such as our hypothetical
academic press. Indeed, we have these examples only because they are
drawn from actual post-Campbell cases that involved commercial
publishers with a greater tolerance for risk than was posed in the
hypothetical.
In the first case, Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,115 the
Eleventh Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction that would have
prohibited publication of The Wind Done Gone.116 The appellate court
did not rule on the merits, but remanded with extensive analysis
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
See Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 2001),
vacated by, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001).

115
116
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leaning notably in favor of defendant’s fair use defense.117 With the
writing on the wall, the estate later settled.118 In the second, Dr. Seuss
Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,119 the Ninth Circuit upheld a
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the work fell on the wrong
side of Campbell’s parody/satire distinction because the book did not
aim its commentary or ridicule at the Dr. Seuss original.120
If parody is the use that comes closest to having a reliable fair
use rule of thumb announced by the court of last resort. From the ex
ante perspective, fair use is not working very well. Even with this
degree of clarity, these two cases required substantial litigation
resources to be resolved. As one might imagine, potential fair users
with fewer resources and/or greater risk aversion would be far more
likely to forgo a fair use in the face of potential litigation.
We have some evidence to support this theory. In the mid1990s, the growth of the World Wide Web opened the gates to poorlyfinanced speakers to publish parodies cheaply and easily. However,
legal uncertainty surrounding fair use coupled with the Copyright Act’s
so-called notice-and-takedown regime,121 led to a retreat from reliance
on fair use in a number of cases. The most notable of these may be
Mark Napier’s Distorted Barbie site in which he sought to subvert the
cultural meaning associated with Mattel’s doll. Mattel responded
aggressively, and Napier relented.122 (To be clear, a few parodists have
been willing to litigate to resist Mattel’s unreasonably aggressive
copyright claims in relation to Barbie.123) Other evidence of aggressive

See id., rev’g 136 F.Supp.2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell Estate Settles "Gone With the Wind" Suit, N.Y. Times, May
10, 2002, at C6 (reporting the settlement and summarizing the case).
119 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
120 See id. at 1403.
121 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2004) (providing safe harbor to online service providers who store
infringing material at the direction of a user subject to condition that provider remove
material alleged to be infringing when given proper notice).
122 See Mark Napier, Does The Distorted Barbie Violate Mattel’s Copyright? (Oct. 18, 1997) at
http://www.detritus.net/projects/barbie/ (telling story) (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
123 See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2003)
(affirming summary judgment of fair use to photographer who depicted nude Barbies
imperiled by household appliances), remanding to; Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Productions, 2004 WL 1454100 *2 (C.D. Cal., Jun. 21, 2004) (awarding defendant
photographer attorneys’ fees because Mattel’s copyright infringement claim was objectively
unreasonable and was brought to force defendant into costly litigation in order to dissuade
him from lawful use of Barbie’s image); Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F.Supp.2d 315, 321-22
117
118
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claims against probable fair uses can be culled from the cease and
desist letters compiled by the Chilling Effects web site,124 and from a
recent report by Marjorie Heins and Tricia Beckles entitled Will Fair
Use Survive?.125 Finally, to extent that the parody cases provide any
guidance, it does not carry over to related forms of commentary. For
example, if the parody cases demonstrate the protection fair use
supplies when one talks back to culture, the doctrine is far less reliable
for those who talk about culture.126
2. Educational Uses
If the oft-litigated issue of parody remains uncertain ex ante, a
second candidate for fair use clarity might be educational uses. Even
with the courts’ well-established allergy to fair use presumptions, one
might give some weight to the fact that half of the purposes that
Congress identified as signaling a fair use in Section 107 are educationrelated: “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),

(S.D.N.Y.2002) (denying Mattel’s motion for summary judgment because of defendant’s fair
use defense).
124 See www.chillingeffects.org (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
125 See generally MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, NYU
LAW SCHOOL, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT
CONTROL (2005) (describing results of interviews with fair users and copyright owners
concerning disputes including those involving parodies).
126 In a number of cases, defendants who have created derivative works based on culturally
iconic works erroneously relied on fair use, notwithstanding the transformative nature of
their works. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’n Int’l, 81 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that
books about Beanie Babies that used descriptions and photos not a fair use) rev’d 292 F.3d 512
(7th Cir. 2002) (remanding with strong suggestion that some books were entitled to fair use,
and some not); see also Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal
1998) (holding that book chronicling Godzilla movies not fair use); Castle Rock v. Carol
Publ’g Group, 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that quiz book about Seinfeld
television program not a fair use), aff’d 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Paramount Pictures
Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that book about
Star Trek with episode summaries and other material not a fair use); aff’d 181 F.3d 83 (2d
Cir.1999); Twin Peaks Prod., Inc. v. Publ’n Int’l, Ltd, 778 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that book about the television program Twin Peaks not a fair use), aff’d in part 996
F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming copyright holding).
The courts found each of these books to endanger the copyright holder’s market
for similar tributes to their popular characters. See Ty, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 906; Toho, 33 F.
Supp. at 1217-1218; Castle Rock, 955 F. Supp. at 272 (even if copyright holder likely will not
exploit market); Paramount, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 336; Twin Peaks Prod., 778 F. Supp. at 1251.
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scholarship, or research.”127 However, although educational purposes
gain favor in the analysis under the first fair use factor (nature and
purpose of use), the situation is complicated under the fourth factor
(harm to the market) because educational publishers have developed
markets for many educational uses of copyrighted works. Courts faced
with educational fair use cases have thus been conflicted about whether
the educator’s favored purpose or the publisher’s market interest
should prevail.128
Nevertheless, because educators and students must use a wide
range of resources that lie within copyright law’s domain, educational
institutions have a strong interest in fair use clarification. In response
to the uncertainty this section is documenting, these institutions have
resorted to a patchwork of strategies. For example, in the course of
codifying fair use in the 1976 Act, and subsequently, educational
institutions negotiated with copyright owners, at times under the urging
of Congress, to set forth rule-like guidelines that would establish safe
harbors.129 These guidelines do provide clarity for a subset of
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also Fisher, supra note XX, at 1770 (noting that “a suspicion
persists among many students of the [fair use] doctrine that educational activities should
stand on a somewhat different footing from other kinds of uses”).
128 For example, in the “copy shop” cases two courts have held that a copy shop that makes
“multiple copies for classroom use” for profit is not making a fair use of the work.Princeton
University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996 (en
banc); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
However, an educational institution that produces coursepacks and sells them at cost may
well be engaged in fair use, depending upon the amount copied from each work.
129 See generally Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001) (discussing these attempts and their drawbacks). Most of these
attempts have resulted in fair use “guidelines.” The most prominent of these have been:
(1) Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit
Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976); see also PATRY, supra note XX, at 344-59
(providing draft materials leading up to guidelines).
(2) Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 7071 (1976).
(3) Guidelines for Off-Air Recordings of Broadcast Programming for
Educational Purposes, H.R. Rep. No. 97-495, at 8-9 (1982). These
guidelines first appeared in 127 Cong. Rec. 18, at 24,048-49 (1981).
(4) CONTU Guidelines on Photocopying Under Interlibrary Loan
Arrangements, in National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works, Final Report of the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, July 31, 1978 54-55.
(5) Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Digital Images, in
Information Infrastructure Task Force, Working Group on Intellectual
127
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educational uses, but because these guidelines serve only as a floor,
many colorable fair uses fall outside their ambit and remain subject to
the standard four-factor uncertainty.
Consequently, in higher education, university counsel and
university librarians often must field a dizzying array of fair use
inquiries. Some counsel’s offices or libraries have responded with fairly
detailed guidance available on the Web.130 Notable among these
repsonses is the position adopted by the Office of General Counsel at
the University of Texas, which has issued its own fair use rules of
thumb.131 In addition, the American Library Association employs a
Property Rights, Conference on Fair Use: Final Report to the
Commissioner on the Conclusion of the Conference on Fair Use,
November 1998 33-41.
(6) Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Distance Learning, in
CONFU Final Report 43-48.
(7) Proposal for Fair Use Guidelines for Educational Multimedia, in CONFU
Final Report 49-59; see also Staff of House Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., Fair
Use Guidelines for Educational Multimedia (Comm. Print 1996). For a
discussion of the origins of this Multimedia Committee Print and its
relation to the CONFU Final Report, see Crews, supra, nn. 215-16; 431.
130 See, e.g., Stanford University Libraries, Copyright & Fair Use at http://fairuse.stanford.edu/
(visited Aug. 25, 2006); Copyright Management Center, Fair Use Issues at
http://copyright.iupui.edu/fairuse.htm (visited Aug. 25, 2006); Univeristy of Maryland
University College, Copyright and Fair Use in the Classroom, on the Internet, and the World Wide Web
at http://www.umuc.edu/library/copy.shtml (visited Aug. 25, 2006); American Association
of Law Libraries, AALL Guidelines on the Fair Use of Copyrighted Works by Law Libraries at
http://www.aallnet.org/about/policy_fair.asp (visited Aug. 25, 2006)’ see also North Carolina
Department of Public Instruction, Copyright in an Electronic Environment (guidelines for K-12
setting) at http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/copyright1.html (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
131 See, e.g., Office of General Counsel, University of Texas, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Materials at http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualProperty/copypol2.htm (visited
Aug. 25, 2006):
We have reviewed all the [negotiated] Guidelines and have decided to take
a different approach to protecting our component institutions and our
faculty, staff and students from the dangers of the no-man's land while
supporting our exercise of fair use rights. We call our approach "Rules of
Thumb" for the Fair Use of Copyrighted Materials. Like the Guidelines
from which they are in some cases derived, the Rules of Thumb are
tailored to different uses of others' works. But unlike the Guidelines, they
are short, concise, and easy to read. And they are part of a larger strategy
to meet our needs for permission when fair use is not enough; to reduce
our need for permission in the future by licensing comprehensive access
to works; and to take a more active role in the management of the
copyrighted works created on our campuses for the benefit of our
university community.
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specialist responsible for fielding fair use inquiries and for providing
general responses. Examples of the myriad endeavors plagued by fair
use uncertainty to which she has responded include whether creating a
computer program that explains the answers to math book problems is
allowed;132 whether student’s free hand drawings of copyrighted
characters can be put into a school magazine;133 whether videotaping
different versions of a scene from Macbeth for comparison is
infringement;134 whether student-made videos containing commercial
music and video clips may be shown on the schools closed-circuit
television station,135 and whether a library can put images of covers of
recommended book on its children’s website.136
These issues highlight the run-of-the-mill fair use uncertainty
that darkens campuses across the country on a daily basis. The
transition to a digital environment manifestly increases the expressive
costs of this uncertainty, which now touches upon systematic uses of
copyrighted works.
A harbinger for this development is the
controversy that has emerged between the Association of American
Publishers and the University of California at San Diego over the
university’s “electronic reserve system.”137 The school has developed a
new system through which students acquire required reserve materials
online with a password rather than by going to the library to read
books held on reserve.138
The publishers believe that this practice more closely resembles
commercial “course packs,” which courts have found to not be a fair
use.139 The university believes that this use is the functional equivalent
of a lawful analog use140 and that any suit by publishers would be futile

132 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, June 01, 2003, at 41
(Carrie Russell, the American Library Association’s copyright expert answers questions on
fair use, but states that her opinions should not be taken as legal advice).
133 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, Sept. 01, 2002, at 39.
134 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, June 01, 2003, at 35.
135 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, April 01, 2002, at 43.
136 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, January 01, 2002, at 41.
137 See Scott Carlson, Legal Battle Brews Over Availability of Texts on Online Reserve at U. of
California Library, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Apr. 22, 2005 at 36.
138 See id.
139 See supra note XX.
140 Traditional course reserves rely upon the first sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109, and/or fair
use to make materials available to students. The ways in which fair use must substitute for
first sale in the digital age is an important subject that lies beyond the scope of this Article.
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and a public-relations disaster.141 However, other institutions are less
willing to rely on fair use for fear of litigation costs.142 A range of
other educational fair use disputes that have arisen, or are likely to
arise, in the digital transition are further highlighted in a recentlyreleased white paper: “The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to
Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age.”143 As
these emerge, demand for a procedure to clarify fair use will intensify.
3. News Reporting
Finally, those engaged in news reporting face as much or more
uncertainty as do social commentators and educational users. News
reporting is not entitled to a presumption of fairness, of course.144 As is
the case with educational uses, fair use analysis must mitigate the
tension between promoting favored uses while limiting the deleterious
effects of such uses on markets for news items. Whereas most
educational institutions are organized on a not-for-profit basis, most
news gathering and news reporting organizations are for-profit. This
distinction at times further complicates fair use analysis in news
reporting cases.
Journalists and documentary filmmakers who have been brave
enough to rely on fair use face sparse and somewhat inconsistent
precedent. To be sure, courts have been willing on occasion to find a
journalistic use to be fair as a matter of law, particularly when the
plaintiff seeks to use copyright law to squelch negative publicity rather
than to directly protect an economic interest.145 On the other hand, in
several cases, courts have found that using copyrighted material in
news reports or articles is not fair use, finding that news organizations
See Carlson, supra note XX, at 36.
See id. (quoting Jonathan Franklin, fair use scholar and associate law librarian at the
University of Washington).
143 Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School, The Digital Learning
Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age (Aug. 2006) at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/projects/education (visited Aug. 25, 2006). [Disclosure:
I was a consultant for the project that produced this paper.]
144 See, e.g., Nunez v. Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000) (no
presumption in favor of news reporting).
145 See, e.g., Payne v. The Courier-Journal, 2006 WL 2075345 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished
opinion affirming holding that newspaper’s quotations from unpublished children’s book in
connection with author’s subsequent imprisonment for rape was fair use).
141
142
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are commercial entities who have harmed he copyright holder’s market
for the material.146
For example, the odd career of the videotaped beating of
Reginald Denny during the Los Angeles riots of 1992 highlights the
uncertainty fair use poses for television news. The fair use defense
failed for use of the video clip without permission for purposes of
news reporting of the event by competing news outlets.147 However,
use of the video in connection with news reporting of the attackers’
trial was deemed fair.148 (Postings of the video on the YouTube
website have drawn a new lawsuit, but this issue of fair use is unlikely
to be litigated.149)
Documentary film can also be a form of news reporting.
Broadcasters and film distributors have greater lead time to evaluate
fair use with this form of reportage than do those who report the daily
news. This lead time appears to work against the role of fair use,
however, because gatekeepers routinely demand clearance for most or
all uses of copyrighted works without engaging in fair use analysis.150
Professors Pat Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi report in Untold
Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding
that The Nation’s “scooping” of Time magazine’s exclusive right to first publish President
Ford’s memoir not a fair use); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc, 166
F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that translating Japanese news articles into “abstracts” which
were then sold not a fair use); Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broad. Cos.,
Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 60 n. 6 (2d Cir.1980); Richard Feiner & Co., Inc, v. H.R. Indus., 10
F.Supp.2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding the use of a single still of copyrighted movie in
article not fair use) rev’d on other grounds 182 F.3d 901 (Table) (2d Cir. 1999).
147 L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd. 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
Reuters distribution of copies of copyrighted Reginald Denny beating video to subscribers
not fair use); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that showing Reginald Denny video on news without license was not fair use).
148 See L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that use of
brief Denny beating clips to promote coverage of attackers’ trial is a fair use).
149 See Greg Sandoval, YouTube Sued Over Copyright Infringement, CNet News, Jul. 18, 2006, at
http://news.com.com/YouTube+sued+over+copyright+infringement/2100-1030_36095736.html?tag=nl (visited Aug. 25, 2006). Although YouTube could conceivably raise a
fair use defense, almost certainly the primary issue will be whether YouTube fits within the
remedial safe harbor set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) for online service providers that store
copyrighted material at the direction of a user.
150 See generally KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, BOUND BY LAW (2006)
(using format of graphic novel to explain difficulties faced by documentarians in clearing
rights
and
obstacles
to
exercising
fair
use
rights),
available
at
http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/comics/digital.html (visited Nov 1, 2006).
146
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Filmmakers,151 that a number of documentary filmmakers have been
chilled in their expressive choices by an inability to rely upon their fair
use rights. A few samples include the following fair use quotations
from their report:
When Linda Goode Bryant was working on Flag Wars, a
documentary chronicling conflict between AfricanAmericans and newly-arrived gay and lesbians in a
gentrifying area, she had to sacrifice a scene involving a
principal character, Linda Mitchell. Mitchell was singing
along with the radio while painting her front porch. To
ensure the clip could be included in the film, Bryant
attended a producer’s academy sponsored jointly by
POV [Point of View] and WGBH in Boston on the
subject of music rights. The lawyer there assured her that
such a situation “shouldn’t be a problem. But in reality, it
seems that there is a problem, because we met the
criteria [cited by the PBS lawyer to be able to claim fair
use] with the Linda Mitchell moment and we had to cut
her out [anyway].” After consulting with public TV
documentary series POV staffers and Sony, the music
publisher, the consensus was that ultimately the
musician/songwriter would be uncooperative and to just
cut the scene. “It was a shame, because it was a moment
which really showed an aspect of her character which
was important.”152
....
“I haven’t used fair use in the last ten years, because
from the point of view of any broadcast or cable
network, there is no such thing as fair use,” said Jeffrey
Tuchman. “I’m not speaking here of news networks.
Every headline I use, even historical headline, even
without news photographs, even without the masthead,

151
152

See http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/index.htm
Id. at 18.
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every magazine cover, I have to get the rights to. . . . .
Everyone is fearful of rights issues on every level.”153
“If you’re doing a feature DVD or for theaters, you can’t
invoke fair use,” said Robert Stone. “Or that is, you can
say whatever you want, but at the end of the day you
can’t sell your film—the corporations and the lawyers
define what the terms are.”154
D. Absence of Procedures to Clarify Fair Use
The uncertainty that prevails even in litigated settings makes the
costs and risks associated with relying on the fair use doctrine
problematic for many users. Enforcement strategies have intensified
the pressure. For example, in some industries, customs and trade
practices once recognized certain kinds of uses as fair, supplying
sufficient certainty to exercise fair use rights for commercial works.155
That has now changed. Legal departments and licensing agents in
companies with large portfolios of copyrighted works have discarded
old understandings.156 In the atmosphere of fear and greed that the
advent of new production and distribution technologies has bred, legal
departments in media companies, once seen only as cost centers, have
tried to turn themselves into revenue centers by threatening copyright
litigation in order to extract licensing revenues from the targets of such
threats.157 Nowhere has this trend been more noticeable than in the
music and film industries.158
From the perspective of expressive freedom, the response to
this new aggression has not been encouraging. In a few cases, strong
lawyers are willing to advise that a contemplated use is likely to be
judged fair, or artists are willing to proceed from a fair use position.159
In the main, however, lawyers are unwilling or unable to provide
Id.
Id.
155 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5-6; AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 31, at 24.
156 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5-6.
157 See, e.g., id.; see also Patry & Posner, supra note 23, at 1646-47 (casting this change in
enforcement strategy more as a defensive move in response to uncertainty).
158 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5 (describing rise of clearance culture in music
and film industries).
159 See id. at 5-6.
153
154
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sufficient assurance or clients are unwilling or financially unable to risk
proceeding from a fair use position.160 Making matters worse is a
situation roughly analogous to that posed by Arrow’s information
paradox:161 a potential fair user who seeks to acquire better
information about the risks of relying on fair use by asking the
copyright owner whether it would be willing to grant permission or a
royalty-based license for the contemplated use thereby compromises
his or her fair use position.162 As a result, potential fair users generally
choose between suffering expressive harms by forgoing their desired
uses or acquiescing in licensing demands that further goad aggressive
See id. at 46-51 (documenting cases of chilled fair use).
Arrow’s information paradox is that information cannot be evaluated by a potential buyer
until it is disclosed, but disclosure destroys the buyer’s motivation to pay because he or she
already has acquired it. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 614-16 (Richard R. Nelson, ed., 1962).
162 The fair use conundrum is only a rough analogy because asking for a license prejudices
but does not destroy the user’s fair use case. Cf. Gibson, supra note XX, at 10-13 (reviewing
law and commentary on when a foregone license counts as harm to market). The prejudice
to the fair use case may not be self-evident. If the copyright owner refuses categorically to
negotiate a license, the case for fair use may be strengthened. See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1282
(Marcus, J., concurring) (arguing that unwillingness to license should influence fourth fair
use factor).
However, if the copyright owner is willing to quote a price or at least enter into
negotiations, this fact could influence a court’s harm-to-the-market, inquiry. See, e.g.,
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting fair use
defense for selective photocopying of science journal articles on grounds that journal
publishers had created a licensing market for such photocopying); Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Department of Justice, Whether And Under What Circumstances Government
Reproduction Of Copyrighted Materials Is A Noninfringing "Fair Use" Under Section 107
Of The Copyright Act Of 1976 (Apr. 30, 1999) available at 1999 WL 33490240 (O.L.C.):
[I]f government agencies routinely agree to pay licensing fees to engage in
photocopying practices that were fair uses at the time, there is a chance
some courts may conclude that a growing or longstanding custom of
paying such fees weighs against a finding that such photocopying
practices are fair uses when unlicensed. Thus, an agency that decides to
negotiate a photocopying license should seek to limit the scope of the
licensing agreement so as not to cover those photocopying practices that
the agency, in good faith, concludes are not infringing.
Moreover, although intent is not formally an element of fair use analysis, as a
practical matter, it often is. See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478-79
(2d Cir. 2004); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d 1992); Fisher v. Dees, 794
F.2d 432, 436-38 (9th Cir. 1986); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commun. Servs., Inc., 923, F. Supp. 1231, 1244 n. 14 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Shady
Records, Inc. v. Source Enter., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26143 at **60-62
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005).
160
161
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legal and licensing departments into making license demands for fair
uses.
If post hoc litigation is too risky, one might ask whether some
form of anticipatory adjudication might be available to a determined
fair user. In contemporary copyright law, the principal procedure
available is a suit for a declaratory judgment. This option is subject to
stringent limitations. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over copyright claims.163 Article III of the U.S. Constitution164 and the
federal Declaratory Judgment Act165 require a case or controversy to
have arisen for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction. As a
practical matter, the declaratory judgment route is available to a fair
user only after a user has made an investment in use of the copyrighted
work and is preparing to distribute it publicly and when a copyright
owner has made a sufficiently specific and credible threat of
litigation.166
Potential fair users who seek ex ante guidance through a
declaratory judgment proceeding are likely to find this approach
unavailing. For example, a group calling itself the Ad-Hoc Committee
for the Investigation and Exposé of Multiculturalism sought to publish
and distribute a parody of a group of works by author and poet Haki
Madhubuti.167 The Committee sent letters of inquiry along with a copy
of its parody to Madhubuti and to publishers of the relevant works
seeking their acknowledgement that the contemplated parody would be
a fair use or would otherwise be permissible. The recipients did not to
respond. The Committee filed for a declaratory judgment arguing that
silence was an intentional act “to exploit the chilling effect of the
Copyright Act.”168 Unsurprisingly, the court dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction.169
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (extending federal judicial power to a range of cases and
controversies).
165 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02
166 See, e.g., Diagnostic Unit Inmate Council v. Films, Inc., 88 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1996)
(setting forth declaratory judgment standard for copyright cases); see also Clean Flicks of
Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp.2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (declaratory judgment
case involving works already created and distributed).
167 See Ad Hoc Committee for Investigation and Exposé of Multiculturalism v. Madhubuti,
No. 93 C 1354, 1993 WL 75103 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993).
168 Id. at *2 (quoting complaint).
169 See id.
163
164
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* * * * *
In sum, fair use plays an essential role in brokering expressive
freedoms among first-generation authors and their successors in
theory, but in practice, fair use is broken. The high costs associated
with interpreting standards and the financial risks associated with
relying of fair use greatly limit the degree to which those who produce
works for public consumption are willing to rely on fair use.
II. FIXING FAIR USE: A PROPOSAL
Copyright law must adjust to the new reality by supplying
copyright owners with sufficient means to enforce their rights against
commercial piracy while securing to users their necessary freedoms to
use the copyrighted works of others under certain circumstances.
Regrettably, copyright law currently is not up to the task. The time has
come to fix fair use. There are four options for overcoming the
problems caused by fair use uncertainty: (1) reduce the costs of
obtaining a fair use determination ex ante under the current legal
standard; (2) reduce the ex post penalties for misjudging fair use in good
faith; (3) sharpen the fuzzy edges of the doctrine by establishing
clearly-delineated safe harbors or by making the entire doctrine more
rule-like; or (4) implement a combination of these measures.
This Article argues that the first approach is best, and this
section advances a legislative proposal to achieve ex ante fair use
clarification through administrative adjudication. After introducing the
proposal, this section shows how it would greatly improve the
functioning of copyright law and then responds to the likely legal and
policy arguments that would be advanced in opposition.
A. Description of Proposal
Congress should extend the advisory opinion function available
in other bodies of federal law to copyright law by amending the
Copyright Act to create a Fair Use Board in the U.S. Copyright Office
analogous to the recently-created Copyright Royalty Board.170 Fair Use
170 See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b). Under the Act, the Copyright Royalty Judges will conduct
proceedings to “make determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of
royalty payments as provided in [Copyright Act] sections 112(e), 114, 115, 116, 118, 119 and
1004,“ ”to make determinations concerning the adjustment of the copyright royalty rates
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Judges would have the authority and the obligation to consider
petitions for a fair use ruling on a contemplated or actual use of a
copyrighted work. The copyright owner would receive notice of the
petition and would have the opportunity to participate in the
proceeding.
If the Fair Use Judge determines that such a use is or would be
a fair use, the petitioner and the petitioner’s heirs or assigns, would be
immune from liability for copyright infringement for such use. Such a
ruling would not affect the copyright owner’s rights and remedies with
respect to any other parties or any other uses of the copyrighted work
by the petitioner. If the Judge rules that such use is not, or would not
be, a fair use, the petitioner retains all other defenses to copyright
infringement. In either case, the Judge’s determination would be
administratively reviewable by the Register of Copyrights.171 The
Register’s decisions would be reviewable de novo in the federal circuit
courts of appeals.
1. The Fair Use Board
a. Selection and Composition
The Fair Use Board should initially be comprised of a Chief
Judge and two associate judges. The Board’s composition could then
be adjusted with experience. As is the case with Copyright Royalty
Judges, members of the Fair Use Board should be appointed by the
Librarian of Congress in consultation with the Register of Copyrights.
Ideally, Fair Use Judges would be impartial, efficient, and wise.
However, impartiality will be difficult to achieve. As a practical matter,
members of the Fair Use Board should be lawyers with demonstrated
under [Copyright Act] section 111,” to authorize distributions under sections 111, 119, and
1007 of the Act, and “[t]o determine the status of a digital audio recording device or a digital
audio interface device under sections 1002 and 1003, as provided in section 1010.” Id.
Under the Reform Act, three permanent Copyright Royalty Judges are to be
appointed by the Librarian of Congress to encourage settlements and, when necessary,
resolve statutory license disputes. “The expectation is that the Copyright Royalty Judges,
appointed to staggered, six-year terms, will provide greater decisional stability, yielding the
advantages of the former Copyright Royalty Tribunal, but with greater efficiency and
expertise.” 37 C.F.R. ch. III §; 70 Fed. Reg. 30901 (May 31, 2005).
171 Cf. The Register “may review for legal error the resolution by the Copyright Royalty
Judges of a material question of substantive law under this title that underlies or is contained
in a final determination of the Copyright Royalty Judges.” 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(D).
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experience in copyright law. The requirement of prior experience with
copyright law generally will mean that applicants will have represented
primarily copyright owners, which will skew their understanding of the
scope of fair use.
This is an unavoidable feature of this proposal. Even with a
cramped understanding of fair use, members of the Fair Use Board will
be obliged to rule against some of the blatant overreaching by
copyright owners that has become increasingly common.172 A related
risk is the ever-present problem of the revolving door. Fair Use Judges
with an eye toward returning to practice will have strong incentives to
render rulings favorable to copyright owners. To minimize this risk, I
propose that Fair Use Judges agree to serve for 5-year renewable terms
subject to review. Fair Use Judges would be subject to dismissal only
for cause. As part of the renewal procedure, the public would be
invited by notice to comment on a Judge’s impartiality and
productivity. Given the experimental nature of this proposal, Congress
should include a sunset provision to induce legislative review at the end
of the first decade.173
b. Administrative Procedures
Congress should delegate to the Copyright Office authority to
establish such procedures as it sees fit, subject to relatively brief
legislative guidance. This guidance should contain three essential
requirements. First, a fair use petitioner should be required to serve
notice on the copyright owner, if the owner can be found by a good
faith search. Second, the copyright owner should have a full
opportunity to participate and to contest the petition. Third, the
record of a proceeding before the Fair Use Board should be restricted
to a paper record, analogous to that used by ICANN’s Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy for trademark disputes concerning domain
names.174 Subject to these conditions, and with the benefit of notice
172 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 33-36 (documenting overreaching cease-anddesist letters issued by copyright owners).
173 I was persuaded to add this provision to the proposal by Jessica Litman. See also Jacob E.
Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2006) (arguing in favor of
sunset provisions).
174 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Rules for Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy (Aug. 26, 1999) at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniformrules.htm#5biv (prescribing process for creating paper record).
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and comment, the Copyright Office would be tasked to balance
substantive and procedural fairness with efficiency.
I suggest the following procedural outline to give the reader a
sense for how this proposal might be implemented. A proceeding
would commence when a potential fair user files a Fair Use Petition
with the Copyright Office and certifies that such petition has been
served upon the copyright owner(s), if known.175 Close attention
should be paid to the appropriate filing fee, which will serve as a
measure of the option value of a fair use ruling.176 Ideally, this system
would be self-funding, but it would also be critical to ensure equitable
access for poorly-resourced petitioners. Price discrimination in the
form of either a sliding scale or some form of in forma pauperis filing
would be a desirable means to achieve this end.
The copyright owner would have a choice of two procedural
responses.
Under the first, the owner could terminate the
administrative process by filing suit for declaratory judgment in the
case of a proposed use or for copyright infringement in the case of an
existing use. Certain safeguards surrounding the timing of such filing
and conditions under which such a suit should be dismissed without
prejudice would be put in place to penalize use of the option in bad
faith.
Alternatively, under the administrative process, the copyright
owner would have 10 working days to give notice of intent to
participate, and another 20 days to file any such response. The
petitioner would be given the option to reply within 7 days. The Fair
In the event that the petitioner cannot identify or locate the copyright owner(s), the
petitioner would be required to describe in detail the efforts made to find the copyright
owner(s). The current proceeding concerning “orphan works,” see supra note 17 and
accompanying text, likely will result in procedures along these lines and should be
incorporated into the proposed procedure as appropriate.
In addition, it might be wise to require the petitioner to certify that he or she has
contacted the copyright owner to seek acquiescence, permission, or a license prior to filing
with the Copyright Office. Such a requirement could help avert needless litigation but could
also open the opportunity for undesirable strategic behaviors. I propose not making this a
requirement initially, but this possibility should be the subject of study by the Copyright
Office.
176 See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law,
55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006) (discussing the ways in which filing fees and eligibility
requirements serve as real options that filter the allocation of intellectual property rights); see
also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 235 (2003) (discussing filtering effects of copyright
registration fees, which climbed from $10 to $20 in 1991, to $30 in 2000, and now are $45).
175

Version 1.3 – November 10, 2006

Vol. ##]

FIXING FAIR USE

43

Use Judge would have discretion to grant reasonable extensions. Of
course, the absence of the copyright owner would not result in a
default judgment. The Fair Use Judge would be obliged to make an
independent fair use assessment. The Fair Use Judge would have a
deadline, perhaps 45 days after the petition and any response from the
copyright owner has been filed, to issue a brief, written decision.
This decision would be non-precedential insofar as a favorable
fair use ruling would insulate only the petitioner from liability for the
use described in the petition. However, the Fair Use Judge’s decision
would be published on the Copyright Office website to assist the
public in monitoring the Fair Use Board’s performance. The petitioner
or the copyright owner would have a right to seek review from the
Register of Copyrights, who would have 10 days to decide whether to
review the decision. If the Register declines review, the Fair Use
Judge’s decision would become final agency action. If the Register
grants review, she will have 30 days in which to issue a decision.
In my view the goal should be a procedure that would not
require a petitioner or a copyright owner to be represented by counsel
to achieve substantively just outcomes. Because both petitioners and
copyright owners may have an interest in being represented, however, I
would propose that in addition to counsel the Copyright Office permit
registered “copyright agents,” analogous to patent agents, to represent
parties before the agency. I envision that these agents would be
paraprofessionals who are or have become familiar with fair use
analysis. Such agents could be required to pass a competence
examination or they could self-certify under oath that they possess
minimum competence and character qualifications.
c. Administrative Record
The petition would consist of a copy of the copyright owner’s
work and either a copy of the petitioner’s work, if already created, or a
detailed description of the petitioner’s proposed fair use. Any
testimony would be in affidavit form, including any expert testimony
on the effect on the copyright owner’s market under the fourth fair use
factor.177 Although one can imagine a number of reasons for why a
live evidentiary hearing with cross-examination would be desirable, the
177

See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing factor four).
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stakes are limited enough that the benefits of a streamlined procedure
outweigh the costs of any erroneous determinations that the
streamlined procedures cause.178
2. Judicial Review
Judicial review of the Copyright Office’s fair use determinations
will serve as an important check on legal errors. Under this proposal, a
Fair Use Ruling would be subject to review in any federal circuit court
of appeals. The court’s standard of review should be de novo for three
reasons. First, the record before the court will be identical to that
before the Board. Under such circumstances, the court would be the
more appropriate body to determine which inferences may be drawn
from the record and to resolve any credibility issues raised by the
parties.179 Second, deference to the agency’s expertise would be
inappropriate in these circumstances. The proposal would be a limited
delegation from Congress to the Copyright Office to make individual
fair use determinations, but the power to make generally binding
interpretations of the law would remain with the federal courts.180
Indeed, the Fair Use Board would be obliged to apply judicial fair use
precedent to the extent that it can be applied.181 It would therefore be
inappropriate for an appellate court to defer to the agency’s
interpretation of judicial precedent. Finally, as has been observed, fair
use now serves as one of copyright law’s “built-in free speech
The Supreme Court has noted in analogous
safeguards.”182
circumstances that de novo appellate review is appropriate when
constitutional interests are at stake.183
See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing why Due Process Clause would
not require evidentiary hearing).
179 Cf. Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir.
2006) (standard of review is de novo when reviewing summary judgment ruling on fair use).
180 Cf. Bonneville Intern. Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 n.9 (3d Cir. 2003) (two judges on
panel would have ruled that Copyright Office interpretation of sound recording statutory
license not entitled to substantial deference because Congress had not shifted interpretive
authority from the courts to the agency).
181 See supra Section I (describing difficulty of acquiring guidance from fair use precedent).
182 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
183 Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (independent
appellate review is necessary when issue is mixed question of fact and law regarding
availability of First Amendment privilege); see also Brett McDonnell & Eugene Volokh,
Freedom Of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L. J. 2431 (1998)
178
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B. Benefits of the Proposal
This proposal will fix fair use in three ways. First, fair use will
become available to users for whom it is currently not an option. This
group includes poorly-financed potential fair users who currently must
sacrifice their expressive freedom in the face of increasingly aggressive
and unreasonable demands from powerful copyright owners.184 This
group also includes creators such as literary authors, illustrators, and
filmmakers whose opportunities to exercise their fair use rights are
overly circumscribed by the clearance culture that predominates among
risk-averse intermediaries.
For example, under this proposal, documentary filmmakers
would be able to rely upon fair use so long as their production schedule
permits the time necessary for the process envisioned herein to run.
The reason that the proposal will come to these creators’ aid is that
intermediaries should accord a favorable fair use ruling the same weight
as a license from the copyright owner.185 Even if they do not –
because there may be a legally significant gap between the proposed
and actual use – the added certainty of a fair use ruling ought to be
sufficient to make reliance upon it an insurable risk. The benefits of
enabling fair use flow not only to the creators but also to their
audiences.
Moreover, as the body of non-precedential, but educational, fair
use rulings grow, relying on fair use may become an insurable risk in
related circumstances. A strong impetus toward a permission culture is
the absence of insurance for commercial distributors who may
otherwise be inclined to rely on a creator’s fair use judgment or to
make their own.186 In many, but not all, cases that position is a
reasonable response to the legal uncertainty that fair use poses in its
currently enfeebled state. To the extent that Fair Use Rulings, and
judicial review thereof, will improve legal certainty, as has happened
with reverse engineering of software for purposes of interoperability, it
(arguing that Bose requires independent appellate review in copyright cases that turn on
substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works).
184 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (describing increase in copyright owner
aggression).
185 See id. (describing copyright clearance culture in film and music industries).
186 See id. (explaining reasons for rise of clearance culture); see also AOKI, BOYLE & JENKINS,
supra note XX, at 52-55.
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would be reasonable to expect to see insurance companies offer fair
use riders to standard errors and omissions policies.187 The availability
of such insurance should lead the legal departments of large
commercial distributors to take a more pragmatic approach to whether
reliance on fair use would be acceptable.
Finally, it is important to anticipate likely dynamic consequences
that would follow from creation of a Fair Use Board. Two
consequences are likely to be particularly beneficial. First, licensing
discussions should become more productive.
The threat of
administrative fair use adjudication would redistribute the balance of
bargaining power in some measure, and this should increase the range
of an aggressive copyright owner’s zone of possible agreement.
Relatedly, when a potential fair user evaluates whether to seek a license
or to pursue a fair use ruling, the user will still face some uncertainty
about whether his or her desired use would be judged a fair use. This
would lead the user to be interested in a license to resolve that
uncertainty and, possibly, to acquire a degree of freedom in altering the
scope of a proposed use.188
If implemented, the proposal also would provide a focal point
for public discussion of the critical role that fair use plays in the
creative spheres. Through such discussion, certain members of the
public will be surprised to learn about the limits of their fair use rights
and the reasons therefor. To the extent that there are infringing uses
thought to be fair by some user groups, educating those users about
the limited scope of fair use will force them and the public to confront
why copyright policy is what it is. If the absence of fair use is
materially deleterious, these users may be inspired to seek legislative
change.189
Fair use rulings also are likely to increase public awareness of
increasing aggression of some copyright owners. It will be particularly
beneficial for appellate courts to have access to this information
because currently they rarely hear cases involving gross overreaching
due to the limited resources and limited political will of the victims of
See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5 (describing one insurance broker’s view of
conditions for fair use rider).
188 Recall that a favorable fair use ruling would insulate the petitioner from liability only for
the proposed use as detailed in the petition.
189 Cf. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 904
(2005) (“In the legislative domain, conceivably fair use is a false promise that keeps the
public from demanding, or Congress from providing, limits on copyright.”).
187
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such aggression.190 It is my prediction that appeals from adverse fair
use rulings would reaffirm for the appellate courts the importance of
striking the appropriate balance between copyright owners and those
who seek to express themselves with the aid of words, images,
melodies, or sounds created by others.
C. On the Legality and Desirability of the Proposal
Implementing the proposal would benefit fair users, copyright
owners interested in legal certainty, and the general public, but some
interested parties and commentators are likely to raise legal and policy
objections. This subsection anticipates and responds to the most likely
of these.
1. Constitutional Challenges to the Fair Use Board
Opponents of this proposal are likely to challenge its lawfulness,
arguing that it violates three provisions of constitutional law: (1) the
doctrine of separation of powers; (2) the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause;191 and (3) the Article III case-or-controversy
requirement.192 It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully brief each
of these issues. Instead, this subsection identifies the key points that
must be addressed, and sketches in the reasons why each of these
challenges should fail.
a. Separation of Powers
In any other context, this proposal to extend the institutional
straddle of anticipatory adjudication already implemented in a number
of areas of federal law would raise no constitutional flags and would be
treated as standard matter of administrative law. However, this
proposal could well draw a constitutional challenge because of the
status of the Copyright Office.
Cf. Noam Scheiber, The Hustler, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2006, (describing how
Thomas Goldstein’s appellate advocacy has persuaded the Supreme Court to hear an
increasing number of cases involving less wealthy parties) reprinted at
http://www.tnr.com/doc_posts.mhtml?i=20060410&s=scheiber041006 [Law & Society
cite?]
191 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
192 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
190
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The proposal would permit officers employed by an arm of
Congress to have the power to declare the rights of two or more
private parties under the Copyright Act, subject to review by an Article
III court. The Copyright Office is part of the Library of Congress.193
The Register of Copyrights is appointed by the Librarian of Congress
and is under the Librarian's supervision.194 While the Librarian of
Congress is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate,195 the Library, as its name suggests, is organized under Title
Two of the United States Code, which governs Congress.196
An opponent would argue that the proposal violates the
doctrine of separation of powers by granting an arm of Congress the
right to exercise executive power reserved to the President. According
to this argument, Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the
power only to legislate, with certain explicit exceptions, and legislation
requires bicameralism and presentment.197 Relatedly, the power to
execute the laws cannot be exercised by either Congress or an officer
under its control.198
The short response is that this argument has force only to the
extent that a court would be attracted to deploy formalist rather than
functionalist separation-of-powers analysis with respect to this
proposal.199 One cannot completely discount this risk because some
jurists are ideologically disposed toward formalist constitutional
interpretation as a general principle. But in the main this proposal
differs materially from the kinds of legislation that has attracted a
formalist response from the Court. Unlike cases that prompt such a
response, this proposal does not have any feature that could be
See 17 U.S.C. § 701.
17 U.S.C. § 701(a).
195 2 U.S.C. § 136.
196 See 2 U.S.C., ch. 5 (Library of Congress).
197 See id. at 954-955 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House power to initiate
impeachment); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (Senate power to conduct impeachment trials);
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Senate power to approve presidential appointments, and to
ratify treaties)).
198 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating the portion of the GrammRudman-Hollings Act which delegated supervisory duties to the Comptroller General, a
congressional officer).
199 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus
in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 581, 582-85 (1992) (describing and analyzing
standard account of formalist and functionalist approaches to separation of powers
disputes).
193
194
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characterized as a legislative usurpation of executive or judicial power.
No executive agency is charged with the duty of implementing the
Copyright Act, and Congress has not sought to insulate Copyright
Office decisions from judicial review.
Moreover, in recent years, Congress has delegated increasing
authority to the Copyright Office. Most notably, the Librarian of
Congress has power to declare certain provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act inapplicable to classes of work so
designated by the Librarian after notice-and-comment rulemaking.200
Although commentators have flagged the risk, the constitutionality of
the provision has not been challenged.201 Indeed, when courts have
reviewed Copyright Office interpretations of the Copyright Act, they
have applied standard administrative law principles as if the Office
were an executive agency.202 Consequently, there is little judicial
precedent to support the separation-of-powers challenge to this
proposal and no feature of it likely to cause a moderate jurist concern
for the integrity of the constitutional scheme.
b. Due Process
Some critics might argue that the proposal would deny the
copyright owner due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
These critics would have to concede that the proposal provides the
standard due process components: notice, an opportunity to be heard,
an unbiased decisionmaker,203 and a written decision on the record.
Their argument would be limited to whether the opportunity to be
heard was adequate because the question of fair use would be
determined in the absence of a full evidentiary hearing.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D).
See Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use
Survive, 21 E.I.P.R. 236, 238 (1999).
202 See, e.g., Universal City Studios LLLP v. Peters, 402 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(applying rule that agency’s interpretation of its own rules entitled to substantial deference);
Bonneville Intern. Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2003) (choosing not to decide
what level of deference appropriate under standard administrative law principles concerning
scope of legislative delegation); Satellite Broadcasting and Comm. Ass'n of America v.
Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The Copyright Office is a federal agency with
authority to promulgate rules concerning the meaning and application of § 111.”).
203 Although there are structural reasons to believe that members of the Fair Use Board
would be pre-disposed against broad interpretations of fair use, see supra Section II.A.1.a, this
form of pre-disposition does not amount to bias under the Due Process Clause.
200
201
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A court would assess whether due process requires an
evidentiary hearing for non-binding, anticipatory adjudication of fair
use by applying the balancing framework established by Matthews v.
Eldridge.204 The court must assess:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.205
Under each factor, the balance favors the proposal. First, the
private interest at stake is narrow because the scope of a Fair Use
Ruling is limited to whether a particular user’s use of the work is fair.
The copyright owner retains the right to relitigate the issue against any
other user.
Second, the risk of an erroneous fair use judgment is minimal.
A cynic might quip that the fair use standard is so indeterminate that
one cannot identify a determination that is legally erroneous, but that
argument reaches too far. Instead, while close cases will generate
significant differences of opinion, there are a range of decision points
that most would recognize as being within the zones of correctness and
error. However, the risk of error caused by reliance on a written
record is low because the most important evidence to the legal
determination is the comparison of the owner’s and the user’s works.
For that reason, fair use is frequently determined as a matter of law.206
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (discussing the various factors and
considerations relevant to ascertaining the minimum process due before government
implements a decision burdening a liberty or property interest); see also Henry J. Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (cataloguing and discussing various
procedural requirements that a reviewing court might deem procedural due process to
require, and engaging in a cost/benefit analysis of each procedure); see also
205 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
206 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir.
2006) (“Although the issue of fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, the court may
resolve issues of fair use at the summary judgment stage where there are no genuine issues of
204
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A critic might argue that witness credibility is material to
determinations of the user’s intent or the copyright owner’s assertions
regarding harm to actual or potential markets and that this credibility
requires a live evidentiary hearing. However, by conditioning the Fair
Use Board’s decision upon the facts asserted in the written record,
either the user or the copyright owner could argue that the Board
decision does not apply to an actual use if the facts can be proven to be
significantly different than were asserted in the administrative record.
As important, the copyright owner would have the opportunity to opt
out of the administrative proceeding by filing suit in federal district
court, where a full evidentiary hearing would be available.207 For this
reason, little value should be assigned to a requirement of an
evidentiary hearing in all cases when such a hearing is available as an
option.
Finally, requiring a full evidentiary hearing would be nearly fatal
to the proposal. The government’s interest in giving access to fair use
to those who cannot otherwise afford it for reasons of time or financial
resources while preserving the copyright owner’s ability to manage her
own assets depends upon a streamlined procedure. In other
procedural due process cases, the government’s interest in expediency
is, and should be, outweighed by the substantiality of the private
interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest. Here,
however, where the issue to be decided by the Fair Use Board is quite
narrow, and the value of requiring an evidentiary hearing would do
little to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation while significantly
undermining the government’s interest in creating and administering
the Fair Use Board’s procedures, the balance favors the procedures as
outlined in this proposal.

material fact as to such issues.”); Beebe, supra note 27, noting that fair use was decided on
summary judgment in a substantial minority of cases.
207 In theory, a fair use petitioner might also be able to terminate the administrative
proceeding and sue for declaratory judgment if the copyright owner files a notice of intent to
participate in the administrative proceeding. The petitioner would argue that the notice of
intent to participate generates a concrete case or controversy under Article III and the
Declaratory Judgment Act. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (discussing the case
or controversy requirement).
If the courts did accept this argument, it would further
bolster the case against mandating a full evidentiary hearing in the administrative process,
but this is a speculative enough issue that it is not necessary to the argument.
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c. Article III
Finally, an opponent of the proposal might argue that even if
the administrative process is constitutional, judicial review of a Fair
Use Ruling would not be. On this view, it is not the job of the federal
courts to determine whether an administrative agency has correctly
issued an advisory opinion. Although one can imagine a more
thoroughgoing attack, let us limit discussion to its strongest version –
the court lacks jurisdiction in a case in which the copyright owner has
chosen not to participate and in which the Board has ruled against the
petitioner. The impulse behind this argument is understandable. Under
the proposal, petitioners such as those in the declaratory judgment case
described above208 who were dismissed from federal district court for
lack of jurisdiction would now have direct access to a federal appellate
court on exactly the same facts. How can that be?
The answer is that the constitutional posture of the case would
be materially different because the proposal has inserted the Fair Use
Board into the process and has granted the Board the power to
determine conclusively that an individual does not commit copyright
infringement under particular circumstances. The constitutional (and
statutory) question in the declaratory judgment setting is whether there
is a live dispute between the user and the copyright owner, and silence
on the part of the owner is sufficient to render the answer negative. In
contrast, under the proposal, the case now assumes a familiar posture
in which the question is whether an agency exercised its power
according to law, and there would be a live controversy between the
Copyright Office and the user.
Although this should be a complete answer for Article III
purposes, a critic may still regard this as bootstrapping or sleight of
hand. But it is not. It is true that through de novo review, the court will
determine the legal question as it might have in a declaratory judgment
proceeding, but the concerns about advisory opinions that animate the
case-or-controversy requirement should be assuaged in this posture.
The question presented will be concrete because of the specificity of
the proposed use required in the administrative proceeding, and the
legal issues will be fully briefed because the Office, by having ruled

208

See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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against the petitioner, will present the case against fair use and the
petitioner will present the case in favor.
One other jurisdictional argument might be made, according to
which jurisdiction should be declined because the dispute should not
be considered ripe. Ripeness issues arise when the agency’s advisory
opinion is one of many means by which an agency interprets and
applies its implementing statute. Those decisions holding that an
advisory opinion is not final agency action hold, by implication, that
when such an opinion is final action, it is subject to review.209 Under
this proposal a Fair Use Ruling would be the Copyright Office’s only
means of interpreting Section 107, and therefore by necessity they will
be final agency action.
2. On the Merits of a Fair Use Board
Skeptics are likely to oppose this proposal with three arguments:
(1) it would be unfair; (2) it would be inefficient; or (3) it would distort
judicial development of the fair use doctrine. Interestingly, the
proposal is likely to draw offsetting complaints on each of these
grounds from some institutional copyright owners and from
proponents of more vigorous user’s rights. I consider these in turn.
a. Fairness
Some copyright owners are likely to complain that instituting
such a procedure would unfairly diminish the value of copyright
ownership. On this view, copyright owners would have to expend
precious resources monitoring and litigating fair use petitions. In
particular, they would be burdened to supply evidence concerning the
fourth fair use factor concerning harm to the copyright owner’s market
because the Board would otherwise lack sufficient information to make
reasonable judgments on this score. Finally they would argue that the
anticipatory nature of the adjudication would make application of the
fourth factor particularly difficult to assess and would lead to a high
error rate.
Undoubtedly, large copyright owners would want to devote
some resources to monitoring and participating in fair use adjudication.
209

See, e.g., United States Defense Committee v. FEC, 861 F.2d 765, 771-72 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Bearing this burden, however, would hardly be unfair. This proposal
merely creates a new procedure by which the scope of copyright
owners’ legal entitlements can be ascertained, but it does nothing to the
entitlements themselves. The volume of fair use petitions will increase
or decrease in proportion to copyright owners’ willingness to
acknowledge users’ fair use rights. If copyright owners are willing to
alter their bargaining stance in the shadow of the Fair Use Board, they
can exercise considerable control over the flow of petitions.
Furthermore, in the main, copyright owners will not be
penalized if they choose not to participate and rely on the independent
judgments of the Fair Use Board instead. As has been noted, these
judgments are likely to be skewed in favor of the copyright owners.
The only petitions likely to be materially affected by the copyright
owner’s participation are those involving uses for which the copyright
owner contends there is a potential market that will be harmed under
the fourth fair use factor. But, even if the copyright owner chooses to
forgo submitting evidence of an emerging market, a favorable fair use
ruling would be non-binding as to any other parties and would not
prejudice the copyright owner’s ability to prove the emerging market in
litigation or with respect to a subsequent petition.
Finally, the costs of monitoring fair use petitions would be
offset in some measure by the useful data the petitions will yield
concerning how a work of authorship is being used and valued. Say,
for example, that the owner of a copyright in a narrative work is served
with a number of petitions concerning derivative works involving a
minor, quirky character in the narrative. Such petitions would send a
signal about demand for further development of that character, which
the copyright owner could undertake or license to others to undertake.
Users’ rights advocates would be likely to raise a separate
fairness concern. Some may argue that the availability of such a
procedure would serve to prejudice users’ rights because the availability
of an administrative procedure could create an expectation that it be
used in all cases.210 Courts may be led to disfavor defendants who
choose to rely on their own fair use judgments, and a potential fair user
may, at a minimum, feel obliged to explain why he or she made a
purported fair use without having first sought an advisory opinion.
Cf. Justin Hughes, Introduction to David Nimmer’s Modest Proposal, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENTER. L. J. 1, 5 (2006) (posing questions about potential adverse inferences in relation to
David Nimmer’s fair use proposal, discussed infra at notes 156-59 and accompanying text).

210
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This concern is meritorious. However, even if the proposal were to
have this prejudicial effect, the net effect of this proposal should be a
greater exercise of fair use rights given the dismal state of fair use
reliance in the current environment.
b. Efficiency – The Value of Fair Use
The fairness arguments may also be packaged in efficiency
terms. On this view, skeptics on both sides are likely to complain that
the benefits of private fair use adjudication would not be worth the
price. Opponents of the proposal are likely to minimize the benefits of
fair use clarification and to focus on, and perhaps exaggerate, private
and public administrative costs. These opponents will then declare the
proposal wasteful.
To evaluate this argument, one must make a normative
judgment about the value of fair use and about the value of fair use
clarification. I have argued that providing greater clarity about users’
fair use rights will be extremely valuable because it broadens access to
fair use and it should produce positive dynamic effects. The value of
fair use clarification increases to the extent one embraces fair use as a
free speech safeguard. Uncertainty about the scope of speech rights
leads to chilling effects. In the First Amendment context, the law has
taken special measures to mitigate these effects, in particular through
the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.211
211

Professor Richard Fallon summarizes the overbreadth doctrine as follows:

Against the background of the ordinary rule that no one can challenge a
statute on the ground that it would be unconstitutional as applied to
someone else, a First Amendment exception has emerged. When speech
or expressive activity forms a significant part of a law's target, the law is
subject to facial challenge and invalidation if: (i) it is "substantially
overbroad"--that is, if its illegitimate applications are too numerous
"judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," and (ii) no
constitutionally adequate narrowing construction suggests itself.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853, 863 (1991) (citations
omitted).
The First Amendment vagueness doctrine also is animated by concerns about
chilling protected speech. Rather than an exception, however, this doctrine is a more
demanding version of its due process relation. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 57273 (1974) (“Where a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation,
is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness]
doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”).
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These doctrines do not import neatly into copyright law because
in the traditional First Amendment setting, the court must balance the
government’s interest in regulating speech against the speaker’s and
audience’s interest in communicating. In a copyright case, courts view
the government’s interest in suppressing second-generation authors’
speech as a means to encourage first-generation authors’ speech.212
Vagueness and uncertainty in this context might then be defended as
having speech-protective features.213 However, it is not vagueness and
uncertainty themselves that are speech-protective, but the contextsensitive definitions of the legal entitlements that protect speech.
Vagueness and uncertainty merely are by-products of that design. This
Article’s proposal enables the law to maintain its context-sensitive
entitlements while creating a procedure to dispel the fog of fear,
uncertainty and doubt that shrouds them, thereby achieving the ends of
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines by different means.
Users’ rights advocates will not deny the importance of
protecting user’s freedom of expression, but some will argue that this
proposal will not be effective at achieving that goal because the
procedure will be too lengthy and cumbersome for most potential fair
users, particularly creators seeking to make a derivative use of a
copyrighted work. It is true that this proposal will not immediately
solve the problems of creators who need very rapid fair use
determinations. However, over time, a range of patient creators would
find the process worth the wait. These could be documentary
filmmakers working independently, scholarly authors, web site owners
who wish to add a feature that includes a copyrighted work, etcetera.
As these creators use the proposed process, an administrative, and
perhaps, judicial fair use jurisprudence will emerge from the process.
As has been argued above, these developments will have positive
spillovers for others seeking fair use clarification. In the long run,
then, the arguments concerning efficiency favor this proposal.

See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(labeling copyright the “engine of free expression” because it makes author’s speech
marketable);
213 See Tushnet, supra note 30, at 70 (arguing that vagueness attendant to fair use and
idea/expression more speech protective than copyright regime with rule-like definition of
scope).
212
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c. Fair Use Jurisprudence
Not all observers would agree that the spillover effects of this
proposal would be positive. Indeed, the dynamic effects of the
proposal may be of greatest concern to critics on both sides. The
proposal would increase access to fair use. Undoubtedly, if adopted,
the proposal would lead to the creation of a body of Fair Use Rulings
analogous to the body of Private Letter Rulings by the Internal
Revenue Service and No Action Letters by the Enforcement Bureau of
the Securities and Exchange Commission. As has been the case in
those areas of law, this body of non-binding fair use rulings would be
likely to influence the development of binding fair use decisions by the
federal courts.
Some critics will argue that this influence would be corrosive.
In their view, the Copyright Office has become a captured agency.
They will argue that the Board will also be captured and will give fair
use a very cramped reading. The proposal acknowledges this risk. On
balance, however, the professionalism of the administrative
decisionmakers should reduce the scope of this risk, and the availability
of de novo judicial review should serve as an important corrective in the
event that this risk is realized. For example, any self-respecting
copyright lawyer would hold that an author’s quotation of two lines
from the lyrics of a popular song is a fair use, notwithstanding the
routine practice of music publishers to quote a license fee for such a
use.214
The argument may shift to a concern about distortions in fair
use jurisprudence because fair use petitioners may not be able to
adequately represent their interests before the Board or a court. This
view suggests a principle by which access to adjudication should be
increased only if there is a concomitant increase in access to legal
representation. To my mind, this argument is too idealistic, and it
should not be surprising that a pragmatic proposal such as this might
be unpalatable on that view. But even for the idealist, there is some
hope because pro bono assistance to some fair users might be available
through committees of lawyers for the arts found in many cities.215 In
[Find Cite]
See, e.g., StarvingArtistLaw, Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts (listing groups offering pro bono
legal
assistance
to
artists
by
state)
at
http://www.starvingartistslaw.com/help/volunteer%20lawyers.htm (visited Aug. 25, 2006).

214
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addition, a number of law schools now offer intellectual property
clinics that might be available to represent fair users.216
If the real jurisprudential argument centers on the likely
outcomes of appellate litigation regardless how well represented a
petitioner may be, I am unpersuaded. In my view, the appellate courts
are the best-situated governmental decisionmakers to properly
understand and apply the fair use doctrine’s allocation of expressive
freedoms.217 A more subtle critique would be that even if appellate
courts are the best-situated adjudicators of fair use, they may be led
astray if they receive a case in the posture of an appeal from an adverse
Fair Use Ruling. In such a case, the courts may be more likely to defer
to the views of the allegedly captured Fair Use Board than the views of
a district court. In this way, the mutually mediating relationship
between the courts and the Board will lead to the ratification of a
circumscribed view of fair use.
This critique has force. But baselines matter. Starting from the
current situation, in which fair use is greatly underutilized, we already
have a situation in which fair use has been greatly circumscribed de
facto. Even if this proposal were to lead to a subtly more
circumscribed fair use jurisprudence, the de facto scope of fair use will
still have increased because of the greater security the proposal offers
to fair users. Moreover, I have greater confidence in the independence
of the judiciary than do these critics. Some courts certainly would be
tempted to defer to rulings of the Fair Use Board, but over time
stronger jurists on the appellate bench would be likely to independently
evaluate the proper scope of the doctrine.
D. Good Policy, Bad Politics?
Readers who are at this point persuaded that the proposal
would improve copyright law may nonetheless harbor skepticism about
its political prospects. As a practical matter, for this proposal to
become law, it would have to garner the support of the Copyright
Office and at least avoid resistance from any of the larger organizations

216See
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/samuelson/about.html;
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/mission;
http://www.wcl.american.edu/clincial/ipclinic.cfm.
217 Accord McDonnell & Volokh, supra note 116 at 2468-69.
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that represent copyright owners.218 The discussion above explains why
the principal proposal is not a threat to the interests of copyright
owners. Indeed this proposal should be even more welcome than the
pending orphan works legislation promoted by the Copyright Office.219
The orphan works bill is analogous to this Article’s principal proposal
insofar as the bill is designed to promote ex ante certainty with respect
to uses of expressive works whose copyright owner cannot be
identified through a reasonably diligent search.
However, as of August 2006, the bill was opposed by certain
copyright owner representatives, primarily photographers, who argue
that the remedial relief offered by the bill merely shifts uncertainty
from users to copyright owners, who would have to worry that their
works might erroneously be deemed orphaned.220 In contrast, this
Article’s principal proposal would provide certainty on both sides
because the copyright owner would receive notice and an opportunity
to participate with respect to a concrete proposed or actual use. Even
for copyright owners, such as photographers, who admit that they may
be difficult for users to find, the Fair Use Board would still protect
their interests by independently evaluating whether a proposed use was
fair.
Even if the proposal gains some support from some copyright
owners and avoids resistance from others, there are reasons to believe
that the Copyright Office and the Librarian of Congress may not be
enthusiastic supporters in the near term. Although some of the
administrative law literature indicates that agencies reflexively seek selfaggrandizement, the Copyright Office generally has been cool toward
expansion of its regulatory and adjudicative functions.221 Creation of a
218 See, e.g., Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to Proposed
Copyright Reforms Since 1909, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 109 (1989) (identifying veto points in
legislative process).
219 The Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 22, 2006) at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5439. .
220 See, e.g., Daryl Lang, Congress to Consider Softer Version of Orphan Works Bill, PHOTO
DISTRICT
NEWS,
May
23,
2006,
at
http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/search/Article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002540997
(visited Aug. 25, 2006); Advertising Photographers of America, Urgent Message Regarding
Orphan Works Bill, (undated) (urging members to lobby against bill’s passage) at
http://www.apanational.com/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=3607 (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
221 See, e.g., Marybeth Peters, Statement of the United States Copyright Office
to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the
Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, Mar. 29,
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Fair Use Board would place the Office in unfamiliar territory and
would likely present some management, budgetary, and public relations
challenges that Office personnel might just as well avoid. In my view
these concerns can be addressed and overcome in the course of
deliberations over this proposal.
The prospects for this proposal, then, turn on the intensity of
demand for clarification of fair use and the Copyright Office’s comfort
level with the increasingly administrative character of copyright law.222
In my view, conditions are ripe for this proposal to be enacted, but
inertia and intransigence in some quarters may make this idea a little
ahead of its time. In the event that this is the case, I offer two less
effective but potentially more palatable clarification proposals in
Section III.
E. Summary
Creating a Fair Use Board would materially improve copyright
law’s ability to balance the expressive freedoms of authors, distributors
and users of copyrighted works without requiring Congress to reopen
the terms of the underlying legislative entitlements. The proposal
simply would extend to copyright law the benefits of anticipatory
adjudication that already are enjoyed by those who must interpret and
apply similarly complex statutory schemes in areas such as income
taxation, securities regulation, election law, health law, and highway
safety. The beneficiaries of the proposal include more than the
copyright owners and petitioners who would appear before the Fair
Use Board because the Board’s decisions and judicial review thereof
will improve the clarity of this area of law, as has been the case in other
areas of the law that implement advisory opinion procedures. Finally,
the proposal is fiscally responsible and would require only a modest
appropriation that could be offset through revenues generated by filing
fees.

2006, Remedies for Small Copyright Claims (cautiously offering to study issues related to
establishing small claims tribunal for copyright cases).
222 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, N. C. L. REV. (2004).
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III. FIXING FAIR USE: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
Section II argues that the best way to solve the problem of ex
ante uncertainty in copyright law is to provide ex ante clarity through
anticipatory adjudication. In the event that the political tide has not
risen sufficiently to make safe passage for this approach to fair use
clarification, I sketch in this section two less effective proposals to fix
fair use that could be more readily steered through the legislative shoals
and briefly address why proposals to fix fair use by rendering it more
rule-like through legislation should be resisted.
A. Reallocating Risks of an Erroneous Fair Use Judgment
If users of copyrighted works whose proposed use is a fair use
cannot be offered the prospect of ex ante immunity, they should at least
be granted some relief by reducing the outsize threat that the remedial
provisions of the Copyright Act currently impose in many cases. This
is essentially the same approach as is taken in the pending orphan
works bill. Limits on ex post relief are less satisfactory than the
anticipatory adjudication proposed in Section II because these limits
will apply when a user has erred in her fair use judgment and has
infringed a copyright owner’s rights. Thus, the ex post approach
imposes rough justice by potentially undercompensating some
copyright owners in order to induce more users to exercise their rights
of fair use. While not ideal, this rough justice would still improve the
current situation in which uncertainty about fair use has chilled far too
many users and has rendered fair use an uninsurable risk in important
settings.
1. Fair Use Rulings as Limit on Liability
If Congress were unwilling to grant the Fair Use Board the
power to immunize a petitioner from all liability, Congress should still
create a Fair Use Board and alter the legal effect of a Fair Use ruling to
be a limitation on liability. Under this version of the proposal, all of
the procedures outlined above would stay the same. In the event that a
Fair Use Judge declared a proposed use to be fair, and the copyright
owner subsequently sued for infringement, the petitioner could be held
liable only for actual damages and would not be liable for the copyright
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owner’s attorney’s fees. Injunctive relief would remain available to the
copyright owner.
This version of the proposal resonates with other provisions or
proposals to use non-binding adjudication as a means of clarifying the
scope of intellectual property rights. For example, the United
Kingdom recently amended its patent law to give the U.K. Patent
Office authority to provide a non-binding opinion concerning patent
validity or infringement for ^200 to assist parties with licensing and
litigation decisions.223
In addition, treatise author David Nimmer has advanced a
proposal analogous to this alternative.224 Under the Nimmer proposal,
Congress would provide for non-binding fair use arbitration to be
funded entirely by the parties.225 Although non-binding, the arbitration
decision could be used by either party to influence the remedy for
infringement. An unfavorable decision would be admissible as
evidence of willfulness. A favorable decision would limit the copyright
owner’s remedy to that proposed by the Copyright Office for
infringement of an orphan work.226 A favorable decision also would be
admissible as relevant to the question of attorney’s fees.227
2. Broaden Relief for Good Faith
In the alternative, if Congress does not see fit to create a Fair
Use Board, it should fix fair use by reducing the scope of liability for
those who infringe with an erroneous but good faith belief that the
infringing use was a fair use. One reason that potential fair users are
See
Patents
Act
of
2004,
§
13,
available
at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2004/40016--a.htm#13 (visited Apr. 5, 2006); see also
http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/opinions/faq.htm (describing procedures for requesting
opinion) (visited Apr. 5, 2006).
224 See David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 11 (2006) (proposing The Fair Use Determination Given Expeditiously
under the Statutory Indicia for Calibrating Liability and Enforcement Act ("The
FUDGESICLE Act").
225 A petitioner would pay $1,000 and the copyright owner would also have to pay $1,000 if
he, she, or it wished to participate and submit the matter to a single arbitrator. If either party
preferred a panel of three arbitrators, such party could designate the matter as complex and
be required to pay an additional $9,000. See id. at 12 n.3.
226 See id. (incorporating by reference UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON
ORPHAN WORKS, Jan. 31, 2006, which proposes adding a new remedial section to Copyright
Act).
227 See id.
223
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unwilling to challenge overreaching by aggressive copyright owners is
that the penalties for doing so can be quite severe.228
Under this alternative proposal, the availability of injunctive
relief should be curtailed and statutory damages should be unavailable
against those who use a copyrighted work in good faith but with a
mistaken belief that such as use was a fair use. If the copyright owner
were limited to proving actual damages flowing from a colorable fair
use, the damages would be less attractive, reducing the threat of
litigation and potentially increasing the owner’s willingness to offer
reasonable terms to license colorable fair uses.
The Copyright Act already makes some allowance for innocent
infringers, by lowering the floor for statutory damages to $200 where
an infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her
acts constituted an infringement of copyright.229 However, courts do
not accept this defense readily.230 In addition, for members of certain
privileged classes of users who prove that they made an unauthorized
reproduction of a copyrighted work with a good faith belief that
making such a copy or copies was a fair use, statutory damages are to
be remitted.231
Under this alternative, Congress would make the defense of
innocent infringement more robust and would extend the benefits
currently granted to special classes of users to all users who exercise
any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights with an objective and
subjective good faith belief that such use was a fair use. Other
commentators have proposed limited expansions of the remittance
privilege under Section 504(c)(2) in the field of education.232 For the
reasons stated above, however, fixing fair use is necessary for all users.
Section 504(c)(2) should be amended to limit monetary liability,
including attorneys’ fees, and to limit the availability of injunctive relief
See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (describing remedial provisions of Copyright
Act).
229 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
230 See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Intern., Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 995-97
(9th Cir. 1998) (upholding denial of fair use defense, denial of innocent infringement defense
and award of $60,000 statutory damage award for unauthorized distribution of work
containing news footage of 1992 riots in Los Angeles); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522, 1544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
231 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
232 See, e.g., Robert Kasunic, Fair Use And The Educator's Right To Photocopy Copyrighted Material
For Classroom Use, 19 J.C. & U.L. 271, 291-92 (1993).
228
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to cases in which a colorable fair use would have a deleterious effect on
the copyright owner’s actual market from an ex post perspective, such
as a use that would displace actual licensing opportunities unless
enjoined. In most cases of mistaken but good faith judgments of fair
use, the defendant will be liable for a reasonable royalty as actual
damages for colorable fair uses that do not harm copyright owner’s
existing markets.
B. Fair Use Rules
A different approach to improving ex ante certainty would be to
amend the Copyright Act to create a list of privileged uses or, less
forcefully, to create a list of presumptively fair uses or safe harbors.
Versions of this approach have been taken through the narrow
privilege of “fair dealing” recognized in commonwealth countries such
as the United Kingdom,233 Canada,234 and Australia.235
Indeed, in the United States our experience with fair use rules
has been primarily in relation to the educational guidelines. These
guidelines serve a useful purpose because they identify safe harbors,
that is, certain uses that copyright owner representatives have indicated
will not be likely to draw an infringement suit. As Professor Kenneth
Crews correctly notes, these safe harbors reflect enforcement policies
of certain groups of copyright owners rather than interpretations of the
Copyright Act, and these guidelines should not be interpreted as
substitutes for fair use.236
However, it certainly would be possible to promulgate fair use
rules either directly by legislation or through rulemaking under the
auspices of the Copyright Office.237 The principal objection to fair use
Copyright,
Designs
and
Patents
Act
1988
ch.
III
at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/Ukpga_19880048_en_4.htm#mdiv28 (visited Aug.
25, 2006).
234 Canadian Copyright Act § 29 at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-42/230536.html#rid230548 (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
235
See
Australian
Copyright
Act
of
1968
§§
40-47h
at
http://scaletext.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/244/top.htm#39B (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
236 See generally Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001) (discussing these attempts and identifying circumstances in which
guidelines have been misunderstood or misused).
237 This is assuming that such rulemaking would be constitutional. See supra notes 126-35
and accompanying text (discussing potential constitutional objections to rulemaking by
Copyright Office). Alternatively, an executive agency such as the Commerce Department,
233
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rules is the general objection to rules: the costs of over- and underinclusivity outweigh the benefits of ex ante certainty and cheaper
administrability. As Congress recognized when codifying fair use,
rulemakers will be unable to predict the range of uses for copyrighted
works, particularly as technological evolution enables new uses and
new markets for such uses.238 Consequently, my views align with Judge
Leval’s239 on this subject because ex ante rulemaking lacks the important
context-sensitivity that the proposals submitted above would preserve.
To be clear, the proposals above imagine the possible
emergence of soft rules through repeated adjudication, and these would
further improve ex ante certainty about fair use. The primary proposal
would fix fair use for many users even if the doctrine were entirely ad
hoc because certainty could be had for a particular use. In fact,
however, uses fall into patterns and over time the process of
adjudication can yield some certainty concerning select uses.
The principal proposal would seed the process for improved
development of similar soft rules for other uses by providing a record
of adjudication of a range of uses. While these adjudications would be
non-precedential, over time, if a particular use were to be the subject of
numerous petitions and the outcomes were predominantly in one
direction or the other, users would gain a degree of improved certainty
about the legality of potential uses.240 This process would be far more
flexible and fine-grained than any legislative or regulatory approaches
to fair use rules would likely be and it is therefore preferable.

which houses the United States Patent and Trademark Office, might be granted such
regulatory authority.
238 House Report at 65-66 (“[T]he endless variety of situations and combinations of
circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes formulation of exact rules in the
statute.”).
239 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1135 (1990) (“A
definite [fair use] standard would champion predictability at the expense of justification and
would stifle intellectual activity to the detriment of the copyright objectives. We should not
adopt a bright-line standard unless it were a good one – and we do not have a good one.”).
240 Arguably this is what has happened with respect to use of domain names under the
ICAAN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy. http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy24oct99.htm An oft-litigated issue has been the use of a trademark in a domain name of the
form www.[trademark]sucks.com. Courts routinely have held such uses to be noninfringing. Arbitrators issuing non-precedential decisions under the UDRP have been less
uniform. However, the pattern is now consistent enough that it is clear enough that a
“[trademark]sucks” second-level domain will be non-infringing, at least if the content of the
site reflects some speech critical of the trademark owner.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Copyright law must respond to the rise of copyright-owner
aggression and its chilling effects and respond to increasing uncertainty
surrounding uses of new technologies by providing greater ex ante
certainty about the scope of fair use or by reducing the risks of relying
on fair use through ex post relief.
The best way to improve certainty concerning fair use would be
to institute an administrative procedure to provide anticipatory, nonprecedential adjudications that would offer immunity from suit. Such a
procedure would maximize ex ante certainty for fair users and copyright
owners in individual cases, would lead to a more robust body of fair
use interpretations that others could refer to for guidance, and would
reduce the frequency of unreasonable bargaining impasse in the
shadow of such a procedure.
In the alternative, Congress should fix fair use by providing ex
post relief for users who erroneously rely on fair use in good faith. This
can be done either through the anticipatory adjudication procedure
contemplated in the primary proposal or by reducing the range of
remedies in the copyright owner’s arsenal that can be deployed against
such users. An alternative solution, the creation of legislative or
regulatory fair use rules, would improve ex ante uncertainty at the
expense of the flexibility that lies at the heart of the fair use doctrine.
The social costs of the under- and over-inclusivity that such rules
would impose in the face of technological and expressive evolution
outweigh the benefits of this approach to improved certainty in fair use
law.
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